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ABSTRACT 
Federal government security-cleared personnel have been disclosing federal government 
classified national security information, whether to a foreign government or the United 
States media, at an increasing rate since the 1980s. Can common personal or 
psychological characteristics or motivations be identified from historical cases that could 
indicate the likelihood of a current or potential federal employee to disclose national 
security information without authorization? Reasons for unauthorized disclosure range 
from financial, to “whistle-blowing,” to a desire to change international policy, to 
sympathy and strong ties with a foreign government. The focus of this research is on the 
behavioral characteristics that are similar or different between known, studied historical 
cases of personnel associated with the federal government who have disclosed classified 
information without authorization. Upon review of existing data, the prevalent  
behavioral characteristic of the cases is one of a disgruntled employee (ideology/
disillusionment/loyalty). A disgruntled employee becomes the largest concern as an 
insider threat, one who is willing to compromise his or her feelings of loyalty to the 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Federal government security-cleared personnel have been disclosing federal government 
classified national security information, whether to a foreign government or the United 
States media, at an increasing rate since the 1980s. Can common personal or 
psychological characteristics or motivations be identified from historical cases that could 
indicate the likelihood of a current or potential federal employee to disclose national 
security information without authorization? Executive Order 13526, Classified National 
Security Information, states, “National defense has required that certain information be 
maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our 
homeland security and our interactions with foreign nations.”1 In order to access 
classified national security information, an individual must have a “need-to-know,” or the 
need to have access to information to perform official duties. If it is determined he/she 
has a need to know, that person must undergo a background investigation to determine 
loyalty, trustworthiness, and reliability, as well as sign U.S. Government Standard Form 
312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement. Recent unauthorized disclosures 
of classified information have caused outrage on Capitol Hill and eroded the American 
peoples’ confidence in the security clearance process. While such recent disclosures by 
Edward Snowden and Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning highlight recent incidents, 
there is a history of unauthorized disclosure of classified information going back to our 
nation’s very beginning.  
Why do people disclose information with which they have been entrusted? 
Reasons for unauthorized disclosure range from financial, to “whistle-blowing,” to a 
desire to change international policy, to sympathy and strong ties with a foreign 
government. The focus of this research is on the behavioral characteristics that are similar 
or different between known, studied historical cases of personnel associated with the 
federal government who have disclosed classified information without authorization. 
Cases studied include Aldrich Ames, Ana Belen Montes, Chelsea (Bradley) Manning, 
                                                 
1 Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 2 (Jan. 5, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information, 707.  
 xvi 
Brian Regan, Bryan Underwood, Greg William Bergersen, Hassan Abu-Jihaad (Paul R. 
Hall), Robert Hanssen, John Walker, Jonathon Pollard and Edward Snowden. Selection is 
based on unauthorized disclosure since the 1980s, including 1985—referred to as the 
“year of the spy.” 
Upon review of existing data, the prevalent behavioral characteristic of the cases 
(10 out of 11 cases) is one of a disgruntled employee (ideology/disillusionment/loyalty). 
A disgruntled employee becomes the largest concern of insider threat, one who is willing 
to compromise his or her feelings of loyalty to the organization and the nation for a 
myriad of reasons. While personal security background investigations review information 
from the present to up to 10 years prior,  
Studies of espionage based on personal interviews with offenders suggest 
a pattern in which personal disruptions or crises precede, or “trigger,” an 
individual’s decision to commit espionage. Crises could be positive or 
negative, and include divorce, death, starting a new relationship, or 
exhibiting radically changed behavior. Commentators have speculated that 
if help or timely intervention had been offered in these cases, the crime 
might have been averted.2  
Thus,  
Assessing the quality of a person’s moral development at an early life 
stage may be irrelevant to the context of later action when unforeseen 
events create a condition of personal strain for which trust violation would 
be a possible resolution.3 
There is no way to determine how many potential spies or persons bent on 
disclosing classified information were eliminated through the vetting of data collected 
during the initial security clearance request process. What is depicted in this thesis is the 
result of employees who passed the screening process and were fully trusted to perform 
their duties. The conclusion to be drawn from this is two-fold. First, first- and second-line 
managers of employees who have access to classified information must be keenly aware 
                                                 
2 Katherine L. Herbig, Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947–2007, Department of Defense 
Technical Report 08–05 (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2008), 
http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr08-05.pdf, xi.  
3 Theodore R. Sarbin, Ralph M. Carney, and Carson Eoyang, eds. Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust 
and Betrayal (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 119. 
 xvii 
of any changes in the personality of their employees. They must go beyond simply giving 
work assignments and grading results. They have to be able to read slight changes in 
attitude, performance, personality, and be prepared to make tough decisions about taking 
positive action when nuances, however slight, are detected. Because intellect and ego 
play an important part in employee performance, the manager must be trained to deal 
with employees whose behavior is outside the norm in those regards. Second, managers 
must, on a regular basis, encourage all employees to be mindful of personality or lifestyle 
changes of fellow employees and provide a protected avenue for them to discuss fellow 
employee behavior. “See something, say something” is a phrase that belongs in the work 
place and applies to both personality and material things. Recognizing and dealing with 
disgruntled employees might just prevent or mitigate unauthorized disclosure. 
Disgruntlement leads to changes in ideology, disillusionment with one’s organization, 
and ultimately may change national loyalty; the predominant factors of which supervisors 
must be aware. 
A continuing evaluation system fits hand in glove with managerial awareness of 
and peer recognition of behavioral or drastic character changes in employees. Formally, 
there is nothing between the initial screening process and a periodic review (after five or 
10 years depending on the classification level). A continuing evaluation system would 
retrieve real-time data from a variety of sources to determine those employees whose 
lifestyle or behavior might have changed.  
Finally, the government must institute a process of routinely reviewing classified 
positions to determine those positions that no longer have security clearances required. 
The fewer classified positions, the fewer employees have access to classified information. 
That lessens the opportunity for unauthorized disclosure and drastically reduces the strain 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xix 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Dedicated to my husband, Douglas Arthur, whose love and constant 
encouragement and support led me to completion.  
And to my brother, Christopher Paul, I wish you were here to share this 
accomplishment with me.  
 
 xx 




A. THESIS QUESTION 
Federal government security-cleared personnel are disclosing federal government 
classified national security information, whether to a foreign government or the United 
States (U.S.) media at an increasing rate since the 1980s. According to Heuer and Herbig:  
Five spies were arrested or otherwise publicly exposed during the decade 
of the 1950s. This increased to 13 in the 1960s and 13 in the 1970s, 
respectively. Arrests and other public exposures mushroomed to 56 in the 
1980s and remained at a high level, with 29, in the 1990s.4  
Can common personal or psychological characteristics or motivations be identified from 
historical cases that could indicate the likelihood of a current or potential federal 
employee to disclose national security information without authorization?  
B. IMPORTANCE OF QUESTION BEING ANSWERED 
Executive Order (E.O.) 13526, Classified National Security Information, states, 
“…national defense has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in 
order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security and our 
interactions with foreign nations.”5 In order to access classified national security 
information, an individual must have a “need-to-know,” or the need to have access to 
information in order to perform official duties. If it is determined he/she has a need to 
know, that person must undergo a background investigation to determine loyalty, 
trustworthiness and reliability, as well as sign a U.S. government Standard Form (SF) 
312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement. Recent unauthorized disclosures 
of classified information have caused outrage on Capitol Hill and eroded the American 
peoples’ confidence in the security clearance process. While such recent disclosures by 
Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning and Edward Snowden highlight recent incidents, 
there remains a history of unauthorized disclosure of classified information going back to 
                                                 
4 Richards J. Heuer, and Katherine Herbig, Espionage by the Numbers: A Statistical Overview, 
accessed April 14, 2015, http://www.wright.edu/rsp/Security/Treason/Numbers.htm  
5 Exec. Order No. 13526, 707.  
2 
our nation’s very beginning, becoming more significant during World War II and the 
creation of the atomic bomb6 and exploding during the 1980s, known as the decade of the 
spy.  
While Congress and the public clamor for greater accountability and oversight of 
the security clearance program, this may not be realistic given the changed and changing 
conditions of an increasingly decentralized workforce and declines in hiring. The federal 
government continues toward a more mobile workforce, working via telework or remote 
work sites, partly as a result of the seemingly constant reduction in agency budgets, as 
well as long, time-consuming commutes. With more outside distractions and less direct 
human interaction, it would appear that knowledge of co-workers’ habits would decrease 
and lead to less oversight. Self-reporting of violations significant to holding a clearance 
reinforces the responsibilities and roles of the security clearance holder, but with what 
frequency do employees relay dramatic changes in their lives, for example, attempts to 
overthrow the U.S. government, bankruptcy, arrests for misdemeanors, or misuse of 
government information systems? By the very nature of the requirement to self-report, 
my experience is that it is rarely done. In fact, in almost nine years of government 
service, I do not know of a single case where a fellow employee reported he or she was 
declaring bankruptcy, using illegal drugs, involved in any type of skullduggery, et cetera.  
However, with the current culture of people willingly posting personal 
information online, persons could unwittingly self-report. Such innocent postings could 
include pictures taken on a trip overseas where the person is clearly engaging foreign 
nationals; or perhaps that casual picture taken at a beach party that shows the person is 
inebriated and perhaps a few “joints” lying around, or a casual comment about not being 
able to make a mortgage payment. While these postings are on the Internet, one could 
argue they are not public, but rather intended for viewing by “friends” or “contacts” of 
the poster. That then presents a dilemma for those friends and contacts who are 
                                                 
6 During the course of the Manhattan Project, counterintelligence agents “handled more than 1,000 
general subversive investigations, over 1,500 cases in which classified project information was transmitted 
to unauthorized persons, approximately 100 suspected espionage cases, and approximately 200 suspected 
sabotage cases.” Manhattan District History, Security Information Book I-General, Volume 14-Intelligence 
and Security, September 26, 1952, Federation of American Scientists, http://fas.org/sgp/library/mdhist-
vol14.pdf, S2-3.  
3 
government employees and are expected to report such violations. New technologies, 
such as the Department of Defense (DOD) Automated Continuous Evaluation System 
(ACES), can be used to discover identifiable behavioral or personality characteristics that 
could be indicative of an individual who may disclose classified national security 
information without authorization. Existing and future technology should be used to 
gather open source information, aligning with the “whole person” concept.7 
Why do people disclose information with which they have been entrusted? 
Reasons for unauthorized disclosure range from financial, to “whistle-blowing,” to a 
desire to change international policy, to sympathy and strong ties with a foreign 
government. The focus of this research will be the behavioral characteristics that are 
similar or different between known, studied historical cases of personnel associated with 
the federal government who have disclosed classified information without authorization. 
If common characteristics or motivations can be identified, the security clearance process 
may be better equipped to recognize those current or future employees who might 
compromise their country for their own personal gain. 
C. DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH METHOD USED 
The focus of this research is the observable behavioral characteristics that are 
similar or different between known, studied historical cases of U.S. personnel associated 
with the federal government who have disclosed classified national security information 
without authorization. This thesis provides a comprehensive list of identifiable character 
traits of persons involved in historical cases of leaking information, including a ranking 
of the characteristics from most to least common. It is expected that the behavioral 
characteristics will fall under the 13 adjudicative guidelines established by the Office of 
                                                 
7 In relationship to the 13 adjudicative guidelines, the whole-person concept takes into account nine 
factors, often referred to as “General Criteria,” that must be considered with the adjudicative guidelines. 
The nine factors are, “1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; 2)the circumstances 
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; 3)the frequency and recentcy of the 
conduct; 4)the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; 5)the extent to which participation 
is voluntary; 6)the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; 7)the 
motivation for the conduct; 8)the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and 9)the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.” U.S. Department of State, Adjudicative Guidelines for 
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, 2006, 
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/60321.htm 
4 
Personnel Management (OPM);8 however, additional methods of investigation may 
create a more complete “whole-person” understanding of a security clearance candidate. 
The character traits may help identify ways modern technology can be leveraged to help 
determine whether a current security or potential security clearance holder be an 
unacceptable risk based on questionable behavior or specific characteristics.  
The research relies on published, open-source literature and provides answers to 
who, what, where, why, and when regarding disclosed classified information to 
determine common character flaws demonstrated by those who have violated the 
trustworthiness represented by having been granted a security clearance. This research 
effort contains detailed research of known perpetrators, categorization of specific 
character traits, analysis of those categories, and conclusions based on that analysis. The 
cases studied are: Aldrich Ames, Ana Belen Montes, Chelsea Manning, Brian Regan, 
Bryan Underwood, Greg William Bergersen, Hassan Abu-Jihaad (Paul R. Hall), Robert 
Hanssen, John Walker, Jonathon Pollard, and Edward Snowden. Selection is based on 
unauthorized disclosure since the 1980s, including 1985—referred to as the “year of the 
spy.” 
The research resulted in findings and includes detailed open-source readings, 
gleaning characteristics of subjects from the readings, and an analysis of these 
characteristics to determine which are common among the subjects studied. Research 
outline: 
• Read any available open-source readings 
• Record details of commonality between cases 
• Analyze most common behavioral characteristics  
• Determine if additional observable behavioral characteristics exist 
• Provide recommendations  
• Role of technology 
• Insider threat training/awareness 
                                                 
8 Initial adjudication standards were established under Executive Order 10450, Security Requirements 
for Government Employment, dated April 27, 1953. The adjudicative guidelines were last updated in 
December 2005 and have been under revision by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence since 
2009. 
5 
• Utilization of “see something, say something” campaign 
D. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
The chapters are laid out as follows: 
• Chapter II provides the literature review conducted for this research. 
• Chapter III provides the history of information classification policy. 
• Chapter IV provides the background of unauthorized disclosure and the 
“insider threat.”  
• Chapter V provides the security clearance process including the 13 
adjudicative guidelines. 
• Chapter VI discusses the role of technology in the security clearance 
process today. 
• Chapter VII provides the biographical sketches of known cases reviewed.  
• Chapter VIII provides a discussion of the gathered data and analysis of the 
most and least common identifiable personality characteristics of known 
offenders. 
• Chapter IX provides recommendations, including limitations to 
eliminating unauthorized disclosure, implementation issues, and 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information by Chelsea Manning 
and Edward Snowden, along with the tragic shooting event at the Navy Yard in 
Washington, District of Columbia (DC) involving Aaron Alexis, have raised questions 
regarding the current policies and procedures of granting and retaining a United States 
government security clearance. On October 31, 2013, the Senate held a hearing regarding 
the Navy Yard shooting and security clearances. During that hearing, Senator Tom 
Carper, the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee Chairman, stated he 
believes the following questions must be answered to improve the system: 
1. Are the right risk factors identified and looked at in attempting to identify 
people who should or should not be trusted with our nation’s secrets, 
2. What important information is being missed in background investigations 
which rely heavily on self-reporting, and 
3. What should trigger a reinvestigation?9 
4. What effect has sequestration had on the security clearance process, and 
5. What behavior signals an unacceptable risk?10 
In Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Gerber writes:  
The issue of security is a significant one. Security investigators and 
authorities must do their best to ensure the loyalty and reliability of those 
applying for and working within the intelligence community. The 
counterintelligence threat to the United States has not diminished with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. A number of countries 
and movements, including terrorist organizations, wish to do the United 
States and its citizens harm. At the least, they want to monitor United 
States’ activities that they perceive as affecting their own national 
                                                 
9 “Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn Continue Oversight in Wake of Navy Yard Shooting,” 
U.S Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September 19, 2013, 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/chairman-carper-ranking-member-coburn-continue-
oversight-in-wake-of-navy-yard-shooting 
10 “Navy Yard Shooting: Witnesses testified at a Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
Committee hearing examining the Naval Yard Shooting,” C-Span, October 31, 2013, http://c-
spanvideo.org/program/YardT  
8 
security. So the granting of a security clearance still involves a great deal 
of careful work in determining an applicant’s suitability and loyalty.11  
Gerber continues the discussion, noting that applicants may have extensive 
foreign experience and foreign contacts—and that while this contact may raise 
suspicions—these personnel may well be the most qualified because of their experiences. 
Additionally, because of the long lag-time between investigations, hiring, and issuing of 
clearances, some of the best-qualified candidates may give up on waiting to fill a given 
position. This theory may not be relevant in today’s economy, in which jobs are not only 
difficult to obtain, but the value of obtaining a clearance can increase a candidate’s 
marketability. Much like gang members joining the armed forces to learn military 
training, one must wonder what percentage of employees seek a position that requires a 
clearance only for the purpose of obtaining access to classified information.  
This literature review focuses primarily on personnel who held clearances and 
committed espionage/unauthorized disclosure to determine if there are measures the 
government can take to hold employees granted a security clearance more accountable. 
Secondly, it looks broadly at the history of the security classification policy and how the 
system currently works.  
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Several executive orders and intelligence community directives established the 
security classification program. Executive Order (E.O.) 10450 establishes the foundation 
of the security clearance process, calling for conditions of reliability, trustworthiness, 
good conduct and character, and loyalty to the U.S. The order calls for consistent 
standards of investigation and adjudication across all agencies and specifies what must be 
included in the investigation, including a national agency check and written inquiries 
(Section 3.a). It further lists the requirements for investigation: (Section 8.a)12 and 
establishes the initial adjudication standards.  
                                                 
11 Jennifer E. Sims, and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 186. 
12 Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953), 936.  
9 
E.O. 12968 “establishes a uniform federal personnel security program [under the 
Office of Personnel Management] for employees who will be considered for initial or 
continued access to classified information”13 and the first uniform adjudicative 
guidelines. Section 1.2 discusses who may or may not be granted access to classified 
information and stipulates the three requirements that must be fulfilled prior to an 
employee being granted access (determined eligible, have a need-to-know, and having 
signed Standard Form (SF) 312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement).14 
Section 1.3 discusses the required financial disclosure of an applicant.15 Part 2 of the 
order discusses determinations of eligibility including reciprocity between agencies,16 
and Part 3 discusses standards of eligibility including reinvestigation requirements.17 
Additionally, Section 6.2 discusses employee responsibilities, including “protect[ing] 
classified information…from unauthorized disclosure [and] report[ing] contact 
with…foreign nationals….” Finally, Section 6.4 advises of sanctions against those who 
disclose classified information.18  
Executive Order 13381 directs agencies to be “uniform, centralized, efficient, 
effective, timely and reciprocal.” Under this order, the director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) is named responsible for effective implementation of 
the policy.19  
Executive Order 13467 amends E.O. 12968, by inserting Section 3 (requiring 
continuous evaluation for clearance holders (as directed in Section 3.b.(i)); Section 2 
(stresses reciprocity of investigations and adjudications by all agencies); Section 2.2 
(establishes the Performance Accountability Council and its responsibilities); and Section 
2.3 (establishes the roles of suitability executive agent, under the Office of Personnel 
                                                 
13 Exec. Order No. 12968, 60 Fed. Reg. (Aug. 4, 1995), 40245–40254.  





19 Exec. Order No. 13381, 70 Fed. Reg. 37953 (Jun. 30, 2005), 37953–37955. 
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Management (OPM) and security executive agent, under the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI). The order also establishes the Suitability and Security 
Clearance Performance Accountability Council.20 Continuous evaluation (CE) is defined 
as:  
reviewing the background of an individual who has been determined to be 
eligible for access to classified information (including additional or new 
checks of commercial databases, Government databases, and other 
information lawfully available to security officials) at any time during the 
period of eligibility to determine whether that individual continues to meet 
the requirements for eligibility for access to classified information.21  
A 2005 memorandum to the assistant to the president for National Security 
Affairs (NSA) delineates the process and guidelines personnel security clearance 
adjudicators must use in order to make clearance determinations for applicants.22 
Naturally, the adjudication process will always involve a certain amount of personal bias 
and interpretation and is susceptible to human error or intentional misinterpretation since 
it is unlikely technology only would be relied upon for the adjudicative process. 
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 700 mandates an integration of 
counterintelligence and security functions for the purpose of protecting national 
intelligence and sensitive information and, among other things, to strengthen:  
deterrence, detection, and mitigation of insider threats, defined as 
personnel who use their authorized access to do harm to the security of the 
U.S. through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of information, 
or through the loss or degradation of resources or capabilities.23 
                                                 
20 Exec. Order No. 13467, 73 Fed. Reg. 128 (Jun. 30, 2008), 38103–38108.  
21Ibid. 
22 Stephen J. Hadley to William Leonard, Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for 
Access to Classified Information [memorandum], December 29, 2005, 
http://fas.org/sgp/isoo/guidelines.html  
23 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number 700: 
Protection of National Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
2012), § D.4.d. 
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Under Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 701,24 senior officials of the 
Intelligence Community (IC) must immediately notify the director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) and, if applicable, “law enforcement of any actual or suspected 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including any media leak, that is likely 
to cause damage to national security interests, unless the disclosure is the subject of a 
counterespionage or counterintelligence investigation.”25 
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 704 establishes policy for sensitive 
compartmented information (SCI) and its protection and provides for the ODNI oversight 
of the program. Section D.4 allows for temporary access during national emergencies. 
Section E lists standards required to be eligible to receive a clearance while Section F 
lists exceptions to those standards.26 
Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, provides “a 
uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security 
information...” and stresses that “protecting information critical to our Nation’s security 
and demonstrating our commitment to open Government through accurate and 
accountable application of classification standards and routine, secure and effective 
classification are equally important priorities.”27 All information determined to have the 
potential to cause damage to national security is classified under this order. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Instruction Handbook 121–01-007 
provides direction for the DHS Personnel Suitability and Security Program and 
“establishes the procedures, program responsibilities, minimum standards and reporting 
                                                 
24 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number 701: 
Security Policy Directive for Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007), http://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-701.pdf, 4. 
25 Jennifer K. Elsea, The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 7. 
26 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number 704: 
Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented 
Information and Other Controlled Access Program Information (Washington, DC: Director of National 
Intelligence, 2008), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_704.pdf  
27 Exec. Order No. 13526.  
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protocols”28 specifically for DHS and is based upon guidance from ICD 704, E.O. 12968, 
and E.O. 10450. The DHS instruction has an extensive list of relevant government codes 
and regulations regarding the personnel suitability and security program. As a policy 
document, it is useful in understanding how the third largest federal agency runs their 
personnel suitability and security program and provides insight into DHS’s interpretation 
of the security clearance program, executive orders and intelligence directives.29 
The Defense Security Service (DSS) has created Roles and Responsibilities for 
Personnel Security—A Guide for Supervisors, which discusses the five elements of the 
personnel security program (designation of sensitive positions, clearance requirements, 
investigative requirements, the adjudication process, and continuous evaluation). The 
concept of a “whole person” is detailed, along with the 13 conditions that may raise 
concern (adjudicative guidelines) and the nine mitigating factors (general criteria). Self-
reporting is stressed,  
Employees who occupy positions of trust or have access to classified 
information are expected to self-report changes or incidents that may 
impact their clearances. Once again, the 13 adjudicative guidelines are a 
valuable tool in determining if a life-event or situation might result in a 
need to self-report. Self-reporting, while mandatory, is also a question of 
personal integrity and certainly preferable to the incident or change being 
discovered.30  
Additionally, the guide emphasizes the responsibilities of supervisors, especially in the 
areas of counseling and the Employee Assistance Program. 
The Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) The Protection of Classified 
Information: The Legal Framework provides a general overview of regulations and laws 
regarding the protection of classified information using executive orders as frameworks. 
It includes extensive detail on the current E.O. 13526, including the eight characteristics 
of information that may cause damage to national security, the three current levels of 
                                                 
28 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Department of Homeland Security Personnel 
Suitability and Security Program: DHS Instruction Handbook 121–01-007 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009), 1. 
29 Ibid., 1.  
30 Defense Security Service, Roles and Responsibilities for Personnel Security: A Guide for 
Supervisors, accessed June 2, 2014, http://www.cdse.edu/documents/cdse/Supv_Role_in_PerSec.pdf, 16.  
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classification (confidential, secret, and top secret), and declassification guidelines. 
Additionally, it discusses handling procedures of unauthorized disclosures as developed 
by the Information Security Oversight Office.31  
B. SECRECY VERSUS TRANSPARENCY 
Throughout history, empires, nations, and even commercial businesses protected 
critical information that, if divulged, could result in the loss of important military, 
political, financial, and proprietary positions. Although the formality of classifying 
information is relatively new in the United States, it is conceded by many to be a 
necessary evil to protect our way of life. At the same time, there are many who feel the 
government over classifies and the non-transparency classification creates violates our 
personal freedoms more than it protects our nation. Clearly, classification of information 
is controversial and can create divisiveness within our society. In protecting national 
defense, public pressure to declassify information can be as damning as foreign 
espionage. By the same token, preservation of individual rights and Bill of Rights 
freedoms may outweigh the need for classification.  
In Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy, Sagar writes regarding the 
growing debate of unauthorized disclosures, especially in light of the Wikileaks incident. 
Sagar provides a thorough discussion of the history of U.S. secrecy, beginning with 
George Washington withholding secrets from Congress, through the Espionage Act of 
1917, up to the NSA warrantless wire-tapping program in 2006.32 He provides 
compelling pro and con arguments for unauthorized disclosures and notes:  
the emergency of new media, particularly Internet-based communication 
channels, has…dramatically increased the ease with which reporters, 
editors and publishers can evade laws or regulations pertaining to the 
publication of classified information. We live in a world where leaks of 
classified information can instantly be transmitted to ‘information 
                                                 
31 Elsea, The Protection of Classified Information.  
32 Rahul Sagar, Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2013).  
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clearinghouses’ like WikiLeaks and OpenLeaks and mirrored on websites 
based around the world.33 
Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang discuss historic cases of citizen espionage, noting 
that incidents of unauthorized disclosure of classified information became more prevalent 
in the 1980s, in correlation to the increase in security clearances. They assert those who 
have committed espionage are “self-centered, greedy, irresponsible volunteers….”34 
Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang remark that the major focus on counterespionage efforts 
must be on people and that “No profile is uniquely associated with people who are spies. 
It has not been possible to ascertain a set of characteristics that would fit every spy.”35 
They observe espionage is mainly committed for monetary purposes.36 Sarbin, Carney, 
and Eoyang also discuss models or frameworks of espionage, including the behavioral 
chain of espionage (intention, planning/conspiracy, access, acquisition, deception, foreign 
contact, exchange, consumption, and escape), as well as behavioral countermeasures 
(e.g., polygraphs, periodic reinvestigations, financial audits, and travel checks).37  
Fischer explores why espionage happens, remarking that by the 1980s, most spies 
were volunteers rather than recruited by foreign agents. In addition, she discusses the 
Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC), including early efforts to 
categorize all Americans involved with espionage against the U.S. since World War II. 
Fischer opines that while financial motivation is the most common reason to commit 
espionage, very few actually received payments. She questions whether espionage is 
“really a unique type of wrongdoing committed by quite different types of people or is it 
just one variation of betrayal-of-trust behavior?”38 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 178. 
34 Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang, Citizen Espionage, 2. 
35 Ibid., 6 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 86–89. 
38 Lynn F. Fischer, Espionage: Why Does It Happen? (Washington, DC: Department of Defense 
Security Institute).  
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C. FINANCIAL CONCERNS IDENTIFIED WITH THE SECURITY 
CLEARANCE PROGRAM 
Several Naval Postgraduate School theses have explored various financial aspects 
of the cost of obtaining a security clearance. For instance, in 1988 Euske and Ward 
evaluated whether financial reporting can actually determine the financial health of an 
individual. They explore two issues: 1) those who receive payments illegally (in cash), 
and; 2) whether financial issues are an indicator of future unethical behavior. The report 
notes that prior to 1988, money has been the primary motivator in espionage cases. The 
findings support what is currently being discussed in Congress—investigations must 
include publicly accessible records and database searches in background investigations 
and reinvestigations. The report does not call for review of law enforcement databases, 
however. Finding opportunities to reduce the overall costs associated with security 
clearances, while increasing accuracy of data by which a security clearance is granted, 
would be beneficial under current budget constraints. The thesis discusses “expert 
systems,” which “have the potential to reduce the personnel resources needed, 
streamline[s] the processing, and eliminate[s] backlogs for financial screening of 
individuals in positions of trust”39 and replace initial human evaluations. While expert 
systems may be less costly than a human workforce, an expert system may not be able to 
detect potential indicators that would be evident to a human.  
In a 2012 thesis, Festa discusses the 13 adjudicative guidelines used during 
security clearance investigations. The guidelines were last updated in 2005, prior to 
today’s extensive use of social media. The thesis develops “a comprehensive list of 
current Internet behaviors and used the list to examine Internet behavior in the cases of 
cleared government employees who have been charged with espionage or terrorism-
related crimes since 2008.”40 The thesis explores the idea of cyber-vetting, which, based 
on recent events, may give useful insight into a clearance holder’s personality. For 
                                                 
39 Kenneth J. Euske, and Deborah P. Ward, “The Use of Financial Information in Security Clearance 
Procedures” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988), 9.  
40 James. P. Festa, “New Technologies and Emerging Threats: Personnel Security Adjudicative 
Guidelines in the Age of Social Networking” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27829, v.  
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example, reviewing an employee’s or potential employee’s Facebook page could provide 
substantial information of personal beliefs or help predict future actions.41 Four key 
questions were explored by examining recent espionage cases: 
1. What online activities are insider threats engaging in? 
2. How has online activity changed over time? 
3. How can new technology help to mitigate insider threats? 
4. Can adjudicative guidelines mitigate the risk?42 
In 1991, Hill investigated personnel files submitted for top-secret clearances with 
“derogatory financial information.”43 The debt amount reviewed was $500 in 
delinquency for at least 120 days, which may not be a sufficient debt amount at the time 
to determine whether a clearance holder is under financial duress. By comparing the 
Defense Investigative Service’s (DIS) “delinquent debt criteria with amount of delinquent 
debt” and Defense Central Index of Investigation’s (DCII)  
final decisions of granting clearances, it was determined that delinquent 
debt is not significant in determining clearance issuance. The thesis 
contains an extensive literature review of the security clearance program, 
number of clearances granted, delays in processing, periodic 
reinvestigations, adjudication processes, financial motives to commit 
espionage and supervisory oversight.44  
While financial motives do need to be explored, a broader perspective must be 
considered in order to get an overall picture of problems with the clearance process. The 
sample size used for Hill’s study was not sufficient when compared with the total number 
of new investigations undertaken. Hill did not study other indicators of unsuitability, such 
as behavioral or criminal issues. His findings recommend raising the study threshold to 
$1000, although that would most likely still be inadequate.45 
                                                 
41 For example, see the article on a former Transportation Security Agency employee who maintained 
a racist, homophobic website at http://splcenter.org/blog/2013/08/26/war-is-on-writes-dhs-employee-who-
operates-racist-homophobic-website-calling-for-killing-of-whites/  
42 Festa, “New Technologies and Emerging Threats,” 3. 
43 Henry J. Hill, “Impact of Altering the Delinquent Debt Threshold Used for Background 
Investigation Expansion on the Denial Rate of Security Clearances” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 1991), iii. 
44 Ibid., iii. 
45 Ibid.  
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D. EXAMPLES OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE BY SECURITY 
CLEARANCE HOLDERS 
Daniel Ellsberg’s disclosures in the “Pentagon Papers” are perhaps one of the 
earliest and best-known modern disclosures of classified information. While formally 
charged under the Espionage Act of 1917 for releasing classified information, Ellsberg 
was never convicted of espionage. The case was dismissed for gross governmental 
misconduct and illegal evidence gathering. Though perhaps his accounts are one-sided, 
Ellsberg has published extensively. In Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon 
Papers, Ellsberg discusses his career from his beginning in the United States Marine 
Corps (USMC), to becoming a Pentagon official, to his release of 7000 pages of  
top secret information regarding the conflict in Vietnam through four presidential 
administrations.46 In Papers on the War, Ellsberg dissects via essays what he considers 
the most damaging pages of the Pentagon Papers.47 This book could assist those with 
insight as to why subsequent disclosures have occurred and what goes through the minds 
of those who disclose classified information. 
Several congressional hearings and subsequent investigations regarding the 
Pentagon Papers occurred. For example, Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the 
Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters48 and Watergate 
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings before the Committee on Government 
Operations49 were overseen. In 1984, Hougan discusses the events of the Watergate 
scandal utilizing formerly classified documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and recorded interviews. He concludes 
                                                 
46 Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers (New York: Viking Press, 
2002). 
47 Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972). 
48 Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and 
Ellsberg Matters, House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 
(1975), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4351138#view=1up;seq=9  
49 Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings before the Committee on Government 
Operations, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong. (1975), 
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0204/1512004.pdf  
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the CIA was heavily involved with the team that broke into the Watergate hotel and that 
the director of Central Intelligence played a part in having Nixon removed from office.50 
Many articles and books have been written on other well-known, former federal 
employees, such as Aldrich Ames, who committed espionage for the Russians. Grimes 
and Vertefeuille detail their personal accounts of the identification and pursuit of Ames 
and provide details of the operational contact Ames had with CIA agents.51 Another 
author, Wise, details how Ames was able to spy for such a long period of time and how 
he was eventually caught.52 Wise has also written about Robert Hanssen, who is as 
equally well-known as Ames. In Spy, Wise details the motives of Hanssen, as well as his 
socially degenerate behavior identifiers.53 Shannon and Blackman, two Time Magazine 
reporters, also portray Hanssen’s story—including details from interviews not previously 
conducted.54 Cherkashin, the KGB spy who recruited both Ames and Hanssen, has 
written his own memoirs regarding the “handling” of the men and his own career.55 
Sulick, the former head of the CIA’s clandestine service, details over 40 
Americans who have committed espionage against the United States.56 Sulick describes  
six fundamental elements of espionage, the motivations that drove [these 
Americans] to spy; access and the secrets that were betrayed; their 
tradecraft, meaning the techniques of concealing their espionage; their 
exposure; their punishment; and, finally, the damage they inflicted on 
America’s national security.57  
                                                 
50 Jim Hougan, Secret Agenda: Watergate, Deep Throat and the CIA (New York: Random House, 
1984). 
51 Sandra Grimes, and Jeanne Vertefeuille, Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames 
and the Men He Betrayed (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012). 
52 David Wise, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1995). 
53 David Wise, Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert Hanssen Betrayed America (New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003).  
54 Elaine Shannon, and Ann Blackman, The Spy Next Door: The Extraordinary Secret Life of Robert 
Phillip Hanssen, the Most Damaging FBI Agent in U.S. History (Boston: Little Brown. Boston, 2002). 
55 Victor Cherkashin, and Gregory Feifer, Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer: The True Story of 
the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames (Cambridge: Basic Books, 2005). 
56 Michael J. Sulick, American Spies: Espionage against the United States from the Cold War to the 
Present (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).  
57 Ibid., 7. 
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Sulick also looks at the history of spying in America beginning with the Civil War 
through the Cold War.58  
Many well-recognized newspapers have published extensively on Edward 
Snowden’s disclosures of classified information and the effect that such disclosures have 
had on the intelligence community and relations between the United States and many 
western countries. Articles include discussions about whether his disclosures should be 
considered an act of “whistleblowing” or “treason,”59 the division of citizens’ opinions 
regarding him,60 possible harm done to foreign relations regarding his disclosures,’61 
detailed information about what has been released,62 and congressional responses. 
Additionally, the papers have thoroughly dissected much of Snowden’s career and our 
current laws have been challenged. The lawyer representing Snowden’s father has 
challenged the PATRIOT Act,63 and Senator Dianne Feinstein welcomes a Supreme 
Court review as to whether NSA bulk surveillance is legal.64 While newspaper accounts 
are not necessarily academic, they give an excellent glimpse into the thoughts of the 
American people (via personal interviews) and the political climate overall. Often 
“intelligence data” is first reported by news outlets—although this is probably also a 
result of an “independent source.” For example, in Luke Harding’s account of Snowden, 
he finds Snowden’s motives remarkable in that he believes Snowden truly wanted to 
expose the National Security Agency’s unwarranted practices and wanted nothing in 
                                                 
58 Michael J. Sulick, Spying in America. Espionage from the Revolutionary War to the Dawn of the 
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return.65 Likewise, Glen Greenwald depicts Snowden as a hero for courageously 
informing the public about government secrecy. He observes,  
Often, whistle-blowers like Snowden are demonized as loners or losers, 
acting not out of conscience but alienation and frustration at a failed life. 
Snowden was the opposite; he had a life filled with the things people view 
as most valuable. His decision to leak the documents meant giving up a 
long-term girlfriend who he loved, a life in the paradise of Hawaii, a 
supportive family, a stable career, a lucrative paycheck, a life ahead full of 
possibilities of every type.66  
On the other hand, General Mike Hayden believes Snowden is “a troubled young man—
morally arrogant to a tremendous degree—but a troubled young man.”67 Hayden went on 
to predict Snowden would end up like other defectors to Russia: “Isolated, bored, lonely, 
depressed—and most of them ended up alcoholics.”68 
E. SECURITY CLEARANCE PROGRAM CONCERNS 
While not an issue of unauthorized disclosure, the Navy Yard shooting has 
exposed flaws in the security clearance process that are becoming increasingly evident. 
Issa, the Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, calls to attention that the 
largely automated process of background investigations have sacrificed thoroughness for 
speed and as a result, it does not catch all pertinent information. Aaron Alexis, despite a 
history of questionable conduct over several years, was able to secure and maintain a 
security clearance.69 Issa recommends that investigators should use the Internet and 
social media sources to increase the “whole person” investigation, that mental health 
records should be screened, and that Congress should consider measures to require local 
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law enforcement to cooperate with Office of Personnel Management security clearance 
investigators by providing specific information that is requested on applicants. 
In a testimony from the director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Farrell, the Director of 
GAO Defense Capabilities and Management, discusses the various agency roles and 
responsibilities for the security clearance program. She gives detail regarding the process 
of obtaining and maintaining a clearance (requirements determination, application, 
investigation, adjudication, appeals, and periodic reinvestigation). The information most 
frequently missing from investigative reports are: 1) verification of employment, 2) 
information on social references, 3) security forms completed properly and 4) no personal 
subject interview occurs.70  
In June 2014, U.S. Army Specialist Ivan Lopez opened fire at Fort Hood, killing 3 
and wounding 16 before killing himself. The Commanding General of Fort Hood, 
Lieutenant General Mark Milley, calls for reviewing medical histories for clues regarding 
unstable psychiatric or psychological conditions. Along with medical histories, the 
subjects of finance, personal relationships, marital issues, and family health issues should 
be more thoroughly reviewed.71 Fort Hood is where Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 and 
wounded 30 others in 2009. In September 2013, Aaron Alexis went on a similar shooting 
spree, killing 12. Alexis allegedly suffered from mental issues, claiming to hear low 
frequency voices in his head, directing him to the shooting.72  
In 2002, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft called for additional measures to 
reduce unauthorized disclosures of classified information. He places the responsibility for 
correcting the problem on “all Government officers and employees who are privileged to 
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handle classified Government information.”73 He notes that while technology can assist 
investigators with identifying and punishing those who commit unauthorized disclosure, 
technology alone will not substantially reduce those occurrences.  
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III. HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
CLASSIFICATION  
Since the formation of the United States, each president has wrestled with 
developing information security policy against competing needs for secrecy and 
transparency. The foundation of open communication originates from the First 
Amendment of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion, speech, press, 
public assembly, and petitioning the government for redress of grievances.74 Yet fluidity 
within political climates, military operations, and foreign relations has caused 
government administrations to adjust information security policy to reflect the conditions 
of the day. The historical perspective provides us a glimpse of how each president 
perceived the need to protect critical state secrets yet bending to the political climate of 
his day.  
The late nineteenth century saw an increase in the amount of economic and social 
data that the government collected and circulated. During the first half of the twentieth 
century, Congress resisted efforts by the executive branch to impose official secrecy on 
the expanding number of federal agencies.75 However, as the United States entered 
World War I, President Wilson signed The Espionage Act of 1917, which contains two 
main provisions: the unlawful procurement of military information and the unlawful 
disclosure of such information to a foreign government or its agents and criminal 
penalties that may be imposed as a result.76  
The onset of World War II increased concern for national security and led to more 
restrictive information control. Creating the regulated security classification system, a 
uniform system for classifying, safeguarding and declassifying national security 
information in the executive branch, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order 8381, Defining Certain Vital Military and Naval Installations and Equipment, in 
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1940. Prior to this, information was designated officially secret only under Department of 
Army (DA) or Department of Navy (DoN) general orders and regulations. This helped 
clarify the authority of civilian personnel in classifying national defense information, 
better protect military information under growing foreign hostilities, and better manage 
the growing power of the executive branch.77 Federal civilian employees within the 
executive branch and the war departments were directed to designate all information 
pertaining to the military, its facilities, or plans as “restricted,” “confidential,” or “secret;” 
however, the terms were not clearly defined in the order.78  
In 1942, while scientists at the Atomic Research Laboratory at Los Alamos, New 
Mexico worked on creating the atomic bomb under the Manhattan Project, the Office of 
War Information issued a government-wide regulation on creating and managing 
classified materials.79 Those who worked on the Manhattan Project were required to read 
and sign either the Espionage Act or a special secrecy agreement, which, if violated, 
could cause dismissal from employment. Several employees were discovered to have sold 
or given trade information to the Soviet Union, as indicated when the Soviet Union tested 
its first atomic weapon, almost an exact replica of “Fat Man.”80  
In 1946, President Harry S. Truman issued The Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This 
act regulated how the federal government would control and manage nuclear technology 
that had been developed in collaboration with Britain and Canada. It also placed such 
information in separate categories from other weapons information. The act also 
established the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), placing nuclear 
weapon development and nuclear power management under civilian authority. The act 
introduced the term “restricted data,” meaning:  
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all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the 
production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the 
production of power, but shall not include any data which the Commission 
from time to time determines may be published without adversely 
affecting the common defense and security.81  
(“Restricted data” and “formerly restricted data” of The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 differ 
from national security “restricted” information.) Restricted data was further defined to 
mean the “design, manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of 
special nuclear material, or the use of special nuclear material in the production of 
energy.”82 The 1954 amendment also introduced the term “formally restricted data,” 
which made atomic energy more accessible to the U.S. military (although the information 
remained classified). The significant money and time invested in nuclear weapons 
development, along with their lethality, requires the utmost protection against adversaries 
obtaining such information. Restricted data and formerly restricted data are innately 
classified by their very nature as they are nuclear information and have no official 
declassification date; the information is of the most important held by the government 
today. 
In 1950, President Truman issued Executive Order 10104 preserving policies 
contained in E.O. 8361, limiting classification authority to the Department of Defense, 
and adding “top secret” as a fourth category of classification.83 Increased nuclear testing 
and the entrance into the Korean War created a more conservative political climate; 
however, in 1951, President Truman liberalized the rules and agencies for creating and 
classifying information under the guise of “national security” vice the narrower “national 
defense” when he issued Executive Order 10290, Prescribing Regulations Establishing 
Minimum Handling Standards for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by 
Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch, of Official Information Which 
Requires Safeguarding in the Interest of the Security of the United States. Additionally, 
the president, “by virtue of the authority vested in [him] by the Constitution and the 
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statutes, and as the President of the United States,”84 strengthened the president’s position 
to make official policy and aligned his responsibility to commander-in-chief. Executive 
Order 10290 was the first executive order to enforce the “use of lowest consistent 
classification” category consistent with national security to avoid over classification.85 
To avoid confusion with “restricted” information, “restricted data” was specifically 
removed from E.O 10290 and placed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The 
executive order also provided instruction on automatic (after a specified event or date) 
and non-automatic (upon review) downgrading and declassification of information.86 
In an attempt to limit this range of agencies with classification authority, in 1953, 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10501, Safeguarding Official 
Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States, which reinstated 
“national defense” as the standard for creating classified information. Additionally, 
classification was limited to three defined levels (top secret, information that 
unauthorized disclosure could result in exceptionally grave damage to the nation; secret, 
information that could result in serious damage; and confidential, information that could 
be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation). The executive order eliminated the 
“restricted” category and under it, “the authority to classify defense information or 
material…shall be limited in the departments and agencies of the executive branch,” 
specifically designated in the order,87 effectively reduced the number of agencies that 
could classify data. The order went on to direct the development and maintenance of rigid 
training and orientation programs. 
In 1961, President John Kennedy slightly modified E.O. 10501 with the issuance 
of Executive Order 10964 which changed automatic declassification four groups: 1, 2, 3, 
and d. Information falling under groups 1 and 2 were excluded from automatic 
declassification or downgrading. Information under group 3 would be downgraded every 
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12 years until the lowest classification level was reached but not automatically 
declassified. Information under group d would be downgraded at three year intervals until 
the lowest classification level was reached and automatically declassified 12 years after 
the date of issuance.88 
In 1972, President Richard M. Nixon issued Executive Order 11652, 
Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material, 
narrowing the classification system. The executive order reduced the number of agencies 
authorized to classify data, established a general declassification schedule limiting the 
duration information may remain classified, established mandatory review provisions to 
address requests to review current classification levels of information, recognized 
specific information prohibited from being classified, and stipulated that information 
must be marked to indicate which portions are classified.89 While the E.O may have 
helped decrease the amount of classified material being produced, as well as establish a 
timeline for document declassification, “The Pentagon Papers” scandal negated much of 
the intended openness of the order. Daniel Ellsberg disclosed top secret Pentagon papers 
detailing the history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia to The New York Times, it 
published the documents under First Amendment rights.90  
The Nixon administration, in office at the time of the disclosure, made strong 
allegations that the publication of these documents could seriously harm national 
security. This led to the first attempt in American history for the federal government to 
restrain the publication of a newspaper in the name of national security. Ellsberg was 
charged with conspiracy, espionage, and theft of government property. All charges 
against him were eventually dismissed under the right to free press.91 The disclosure of 
the Pentagon papers and the subsequent actions by the federal government created an 
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environment in which the press and the public became more distrustful of the government 
and questioned its openness. The debate remains whether the disclosure of the Pentagon 
papers did in fact damage national security. The dismissal of the charges against Ellsberg 
have had a lingering effect on the “credibility gap” between the public and the 
government, as well as transparency policies of subsequent administrations. Senator 
Birch Bayh supported the publication of the Pentagon papers stating:  
The existence of these documents, and the fact that they [the 
administration] said one thing and the people were led to believe 
something else, is a reason we have a credibility gap today, the reason 
people don’t believe the government. This is the same thing that’s been 
going on over the last two-and-a-half years of this administration. There is 
a difference between what the President says and what the government 
actually does, and I have confidence that they are going to make the right 
decision, if they have all the facts.92  
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12065, National Security 
Information, which continued to relax classification requirements. “In order to balance 
the public’s interest in access to Government information with the need to protect certain 
national security information from disclosure,” E.O. 12065 identified seven categories of 
classifiable information: 
a) military plans, weapons or operations; 
b) foreign government information; 
c) intelligence activities, sources, or methods; foreign relations or foreign 
activities of the United States; 
d) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security; 
e) United States government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or 
facilities; or 
f) other categories of information which are related to national security and 
which require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by 
the President, by a person designated by the President…, or by an agency 
head.93 
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E.O. 12065 continued automatic declassification, enacted a policy of using a less 
restrictive classification designation when there is reasonable doubt as to the 
classification existed, changed the “confidential” definition to require “identifiable 
damage” rather than simply damage, and established the Information Security Oversight 
Office (ISOO) to ensure compliance with the order. A more conservative approach to 
classification was adopted in 1982 by President Ronald Reagan. He issued Executive 
Order 12356, National Security Information, which expanded the levels of classified 
information to:  
1) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or 
plans relating to national security; 
2) cryptology; [or] 
3) a confidential source….94 
Classifiers were instructed to err on the side of classification;95 and automatic 
declassification requirements (after a certain time period or event) were removed. 
Furthermore, E.O. 12356 removed the requirement for the classifier to describe 
“identifiable damage,” and the executive order allowed for reclassification of national 
security information if the declassified information required protection in the interest of 
national security and could be reasonably recovered.96 Regarding E.O. 12356, Steven 
Garfinkel, the Director of the General Services Administration’s Information Security 
Oversight Office, states, “… our oversight experience shows that over the past decade the 
number of decisions to classify information is relatively constant. The most important 
variable is not the particular information security system in place, but rather the status of 
world affairs.”97 Around the time the executive order went into effect, the U.S. and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the Soviet Union were embroiled in the 
Cold War and stockpiles of nuclear weapons in both countries had swelled. President 
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Reagan’s expanded classification policy granted federal officials increased authority to 
classify more information than had been previously classified. 
In 1995, President Bill Clinton adopted a less restrictive classification policy 
under Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information. During this time, 
several eastern European countries were taking on a democratic government, and the 
Cold War concluded following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Classification categories 
were reduced from 10 to seven; cryptology, confidential source and “other categories of 
information which are related to national security” were removed from classification. The 
requirement to define “identifiable damage” was restored. The main change with E.O. 
12958 was in the area of declassification. The previous executive order had no provisions 
for automatic declassification based upon the time duration from original classification 
and this executive order directs that if an original classification authority cannot 
determine an earlier specific date or event for declassification, the information will be 
marked for declassification, and not exceed, 10 years from the date of the original 
decision.98 However, information that concerned any of the seven classification 
categories and that may retain sensitivity could be extended an additional 10 years. Along 
with imposed deadlines for declassification of classified information, E.O. 12958 made 
information more difficult to classify.  
In 2003, following the events of September 11, 2001 and the launching of the 
global war on terror (GWOT) military campaign, President George Bush issued E.O. 
13292, adding two classification categories: “vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, 
installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national 
security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism” and “weapons of mass 
destruction.” This again increased the amount of information to be classified. The order 
also eased the reclassification of declassified records, postponed automatic 
declassification, eliminated the requirement for agencies to prepare declassification 
records, and authorized the director of central intelligence (DCI) to object to 
declassification of information determined eligible by the Interagency Security 
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Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which would remain protected, unless the 
president reversed the decision.99 Automatic declassification of records classified over 25 
years had been postponed for over three years, thus E.O. 13292 provided for more 
information to be classified and for longer periods of time.  
Finally, in 2009, President Barack Obama issued E.O. 13526, Classifying 
National Security Information, rescinding previous orders. In order to improve openness 
of the government to the public, President Obama ordered two studies into the amount of 
information the executive branch was classifying. Additionally, protecting “controlled 
unclassified information” and “sensitive but unclassified” information policy was to be 
reviewed and standardized across all agencies.100 The order directed creation of a 
National Declassification Center (NDC) to increase declassification efforts across 
agencies. Moreover, “no information [could] remain classified indefinitely” and 
deadlines were once again published for declassifying information that was exempted 
from within 25 years.101 The three levels of classification were carried forward, top 
secret, in which unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause 
exceptionally grave damage to national security; secret, which could be expected to cause 
serious damage; and confidential, which could reasonably be expected to cause damage. 
E.O. 13526 declares, “Our democratic principles require that the American people 
be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation’s progress depends 
on the free flow of information both within the Government and American people.”102 
Over the past 14 years, there has been a significant decrease in spending on 
declassification and a significant increase in spending on classification management.  
In 2012, the federal government spent $9.77 billion dollars on government 
security classification costs, including $48.65 million on declassification and $1.69 
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billion on classification management.103 In contrast, in 1998, $199.65 million was 
allocated for declassification and $212.96 million for classification management.104 
Given the current budget crisis America faces, one could question the efficacy of 
spending so much money on management of larger and larger quantities of classified 
documents.  
World affairs have helped dictate U.S. administrative policy on protecting 
classified information. While policy pertaining to classification of sensitive information 
has been in effect since the 1940s, how well is the U.S. national security information 
actually being protected? Nowhere in any of the executive orders are there provisions for 
granting security clearances, who could or could not work with classified documents, or 
policies anything pertaining to punishment in the case where a classified document was 
compromised. Can policy be effective to prevent leaks, intentional or unintentional? 
Examples presented in this thesis show not only policy on information protection may 
need to be revised, but also security clearance vetting and issuance procedures and 
implementing a more thorough training program require greater emphasis. 
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IV. DISCUSSION OF INSIDER THREAT AND UNAUTHORIZED 
DISCLOSURE 
State secrecy versus transparency is part of the growing debate regarding 
unauthorized disclosures, especially in light of recent disclosures by Chelsea Manning 
and Edward Snowden. Recurring unauthorized disclosures can cause harm by causing 
damage to intelligence sources and methods, potential loss of life, a financial cost 
associated with the release as well as harm to international alliances  
because, if repeated often enough, they will lessen the willingness of local 
sources to share sensitive info with American diplomats (and also make 
diplomats reluctant to share with each other what they have learned 
through their careful cultivated networks of informants).105  
The insider threat “can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, 
unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or 
degradation of resources or capabilities.”106 
When it comes to those who commit unauthorized disclosure, several terms are 
bantered about: espionage, whistleblower, spy, patriot, and traitor. Regardless what term 
is used, it is more important to understand why people choose to spy or disclose sensitive 
information with which they have been entrusted. In the case of a spy, Sarbin, Carney, 
and Eoyang list several steps a person takes in becoming a spy. The first step is the 
opportunity and access to sell or steal classified information and access to a potential 
customer. They describe the remaining steps:  
Second, the prospect of espionage must occur to the potential spy and not 
be dismissed out of hand; the behavior must be ‘available’ or conceivable. 
Perhaps in some cases the opportunity comes along first and then the 
possibility comes to mind; in others, the idea arises, and then the 
opportunity is sought out. But whatever the order, opportunity and idea are 
the basic preconditions. Next, the potential spy needs a motive strong 
enough to take the risk. Fourth, any inhibitions of conscience must be 
overridden. And last, our potential spy must not be prevented by others, in 
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the form of locked doors, security guards, restrictions on access to 
classified materials, or other external constraints, from succeeding at 
espionage. In addition to espionage, this model could describe most types 
of planned crime.107 
We know whistleblowers normally try to right a wrong or expose persons in 
authority applying policy to benefit themselves or friends. Jos, Tompkins, and Hays 
define whistleblowers as “support[ing]…the idea that universal moral rules exist that 
ought to guide one’s judgments” as determined by a survey of former whistleblowers 
which 58 percent of the respondents “expressed support for universal moral rules….”108 
Alford argues that whistleblowers are ultimately motivated from “narcissism moralized” 
and “act out of fear of disassociation with one’s ideal self and do not have an empathetic 
association with the sufferer. Instead, whistleblowers feel morally corrupted by 
association with an aggressor.”109 
While most people do not admire “tattle-tales,” today, whistleblowers have gained 
a slight measure of respect. Examples of this elevated respect are clearly seen by military 
veterans whose voices are now being heard because of a handful of U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) whistleblowers about “wait time” scandals and less than 
professional care at VA hospitals. One of the more famous whistleblowers was Karen 
Silkwood, who blew the whistle on unsafe nuclear energy plant production. Protection 
offered for whistleblowers has improved over the years and was recently strengthened by 
President Obama when he signed into law Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 19 
providing additional protection for intelligence agency employees.110 
While the concept of “insider threat” has long been recognized (cloaked under the 
Espionage Act of 1917), the term has come to light recently as a result of unauthorized 
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disclosures of Manning and Snowden, as well as the tragedy of the Washington, DC 
Naval Yard shooting carried out by Aaron Alexis.111 As Sarbin writes,  
Those who sell secrets or collect information for other countries have 
weakened internal constraints or internal constraints that have failed. 
These peoples’ consciences, their anticipation of feeling guilty or ashamed 
before others if caught, or their sense of violating an unspoken contract to 
uphold the well-being of others has not overcome the opportunity, the idea 
and the motivation to commit espionage. Whatever pricks of conscience 
they felt, they steeled themselves to ignore them. They told themselves 
rationalizations and explanations for the behavior they contemplated….112  
Such as in the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed for disclosing 
nuclear information to the Soviet Union, could behavioral characteristics, possibly moral 
characteristics (or lack thereof) have been observed that would have predicted their 
unauthorized disclosure? 
According to Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang, “The spy puts himself, his need for 
money, thrills, or some other satisfaction above the well-being of his fellow citizens and 
the nation. He is self-seeking, ‘doing his own thing,’ and ‘looking out for number 
one.’”113 Unfortunately, these character flaws may not be detected during the personnel 
security investigative process as noted by the Defense Personal Security Research Center 
(PERSEREC), especially in new employees or very young employees. Herbig notes, 
“People change with time while they have access, however, which is why security 
programs incorporate continuous evaluation measures, and why they update their 
information on these criteria in order to capture changes of security concern.”114  
Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang rather succinctly cover the gamut of reasons people 
turn their back on the government when they opine:  
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Recently detected acts of espionage have been undertaken by self-
centered, greedy, irresponsible volunteers. Most of them seem to have 
been motivated by a desire for money, either out of greed or need. Many 
of them acted in retaliation for real or imagined wrongs inflicted by 
someone with authority over them. Personal failures could have stimulated 
some to defy the law in a mistaken attempt to gain self-esteem.115  
They continue to say most of the recent crimes are committed by low to mid-level 
employees, former employees, or military who “became spies out of the desire for 
revenge, because of disgruntlement with circumstances of their lives, for ideological 
reasons, for money, at least once for sex, and because of frustration in achieving 
professional goals”116 However, Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang conclude that motivations 
cannot be matched to a particular personality type.117  
Established organization practices “such as prioritizing production over security, 
failure to share information across subunits, inadequate rules or inappropriate waiving of 
rules, exaggerated faith in group loyalty, and excessive focus on external threats—can be 
seen in many past failures to protect against insider threats.”118 Employees who report 
behavioral indicators (e.g., unexplained affluence, foreign trips, unusual working hours) 
to supervisors may downplay them because of office culture. Supervisors who may 
observe these behaviors in employees themselves may do the same. In addition, 
employees may not want to accuse a colleague, overlooking the behavior with regard to 
the workload or unusual working conditions, nor may they want to admit that an 
organization may be vulnerable.  
Recognition of these behavioral abnormalities or changes has to occur at the 
lowest level, meaning employee to employee or first-line supervisor level. While 
agencies may encourage loyalty and employee morale in order to encourage more 
effective operations:  
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organizational leaders should never assume that their personnel are so 
loyal that they will never be subject to ideologies, shifting allegiances, or 
personal incentives that could lead them to become insider threats. 
Managers should beware of the “halo effect,” in which well-liked 
employees are assumed to be trustworthy (a special case of affect bias, the 
tendency we all have to assume that something we like for a particular 
reason has other positive qualities as well).119 
A successful background investigation does not ensure an employee will not 
become an insider threat. The Personnel Security Program (PSP) is designed to measure a 
person’s reliability measured against established personnel security criteria (currently 
there are 13 of those as discussed in Section II.C) and even then is not a good predictor of 
whether a person is a threat to national security. For example, Manning and Snowden did 
not fit a template for someone prone to disclose classified information. Both passed 
successful background checks, and neither had spent years in super sensitive positions. 
The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) describe Manning and Snowden 
as “freedom fighters” rather than threats to national security since those who execute 
unauthorized disclosures generally did so after an average of 12 years of service. 
Notwithstanding any length of service, the NSA argues for more stringent background 
checks.120 This may reflect the average time it takes for an employee to know a position 
well enough, have access to materials, achieve the comfort level necessary to steal 
classified national security information and have the nerve to sell it or disclose it to the 
general public.  
In order to reduce the risk of insider threat, the culture of an organization must be 
one of loyalty to each other. As put by General Eugene Habiger, the former Department 
of Energy (DOE) “security czar” and former commander of U.S. strategic forces, “Good 
security is 20 percent hardware and 80 percent culture.”121 From the smallest team to the 
entire organization, employees must understand that security is everyone’s responsibility. 
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According to Bunn et al., “Establishing clear incentives that make employees understand 
that they will be rewarded for good security performance is one key element of building 
such a culture, and of making clear the priority that management places on security.”122 
A second critical aspect of security is employee satisfaction. Bunn et al. explain:  
Disgruntled employees are much more likely to become insiders—and 
much less likely to proactively help to improve security by reporting odd 
or suspicious behavior or by creatively looking for security vulnerabilities 
and ways to fix them. In situations ranging from retail theft to IT 
[information technology] sabotage, disgruntlement has been found to be a 
key driver of insider threats.123  
Thousands of books on management describe methods to reduce employee 
disgruntlement and create a positive and secure climate in the organization. These include 
but certainly are not limited to allowing a complaint or suggestion process to address 
office issues, recognition of and reward for good performance, creation of an 
environment of fairness, and addressing supervisory failings. As Bunn et al. advocate:  
Efforts to prevent insider threats primarily through screening for loyalty 
or, conversely, monitoring for ties to malicious terrorist or criminal 
organizations are insufficient. Such methods will not detect or deter 
individuals who make poor judgments, even radically poor judgments, in 
the name of a private interest or even in pursuit of a distorted vision of the 
public good.124  
Loyalty to the organization, colleagues, and, ultimately, the American people will aid in 
employees making sound judgments. It will also decrease the likelihood of unauthorized 
disclosure.  
Chaney explains the psychology of an “insider spy” as  
an intolerable sense of personal failure, as privately defined by that 
person…. What turns out to be key is how this intolerable sense of 
personal failure gets managed. Almost always, this is a state of mind based 
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on male psychology. Over 95% of insider spies are males. Injuries to male 
pride and ego are at the root of most cases of insider spying.125  
He goes on to write:  
For a man, maintaining a stable sense of personal worth is key. However, 
the insider spy experiences three tremendous losses: He suffers two 
failures before getting caught: His first failure was his inability to 
successfully navigate his own life; his second failure was discovering that 
his best attempt to solve his worst life crisis turned out to be a pathetic 
delusion as he is now merely a puppet on the string of his handler. His 
third and very public failure is that he could not even succeed at being an 
insider spy.126  
Chaney urges that we get away “from mainstream explanations that insider spies 
are born bad, or that a fixed personality type will predict for insider spying.”127 The usual 
thoughts of motivations, greed, and ego are less relevant than individual events in a 
person’s life or his or her life stressors (e.g., divorce, death in the family, financial 
concerns)—the environment in which an individual exists. Because of personal 
experiences, predicting who may release classified information is not probable.  
In September 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) published The DOD 
Insider Threat Program that  
Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities within DOD to develop and 
maintain an insider threat program to comply with the requirements and 
minimum standards to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate actions by 
malicious insiders who represent a threat to national security or DOD 
personnel, facilities, operations, and resources.128  
Developing insider threat awareness, training, and education will assist in the 
creation of a cohesive organizational culture—one in which employees know their roles 
and responsibilities in an agency, regardless of whether or not they hold a security 
clearance. This culture is critical to protect valuable assets as organizations:  
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also have other, often competing, goals: managers are often tempted to 
instruct employees to bend the security rules to increase productivity, meet 
a deadline, or avoid inconvenience. And every hour an employee spends 
following the letter of security procedures is an hour not spent on activities 
more likely to result in a promotion or a raise. Other motivations—
friendships, union solidarity, and familial ties—can also affect adherence 
to strict security rules.129 
Directed by the National Insider Threat Policy, insider threat programs for the 
executive branch agencies are “intended to: deter cleared employees from becoming 
insider threats; detect insiders who pose a risk to classified information; and mitigate the 
risks through administrative, investigative or other response actions.”130 As such, the 
Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs direct employee 
training and awareness to address: 
a. The importance of detecting potential insider threats by cleared employees 
and reporting suspected activity to insider threat personnel or other 
designated officials; 
b. Methodologies of adversaries to recruit trusted insiders and collect 
classified information; 
c. Indicators of insider threat behavior and procedures to report such 
behavior; and  
d. Counterintelligence and security reporting requirements, as applicable.131 
The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) notes the most 
damaging United States counterintelligence failures over the past century have been 
committed by an insider. In each case, the individuals showed behavioral indicators of 
concern that went undetected “for years due to the unwillingness or inability of 
colleagues to accept the possibility of treason.”132 Other times, when coworkers reported 
apprehensions to a supervisor, no action was taken. With early intervention and 
counseling, individuals at risk for disclosing information may be prevented from doing 
so. “See something, say something” truly applies for creating an agency culture of 
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loyalty—one that may prevent a trusted friend or coworker from disclosing information 
and spending the rest of his or her life in prison. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has comprised a list of behavioral 
indicators that may signal an employee at risk: 
• Without need or authorization, takes proprietary or other material home 
via documents, thumb drives, computer disks, or email. 
• Inappropriately seeks or obtains proprietary or classified information on 
subjects not related to their work duties. 
• Interest in matters outside the scope of their duties, particularly those of 
interest to foreign entities or business competitors. 
• Unnecessarily copies material, especially if it is proprietary or classified. 
• Remotely accesses the computer network while on vacation, sick leave, or 
at other odd times. 
• Disregards company computer policies on installing personal software or 
hardware, accessing restricted websites, conducting unauthorized 
searches, or downloading confidential information. 
• Works odd hours without authorization; notable enthusiasm for overtime 
work, weekend work, or unusual schedules when clandestine activities 
could be more easily conducted. 
• Unreported foreign contacts (particularly with foreign government 
officials or intelligence officials) or unreported overseas travel. 
• Short trips to foreign countries for unexplained or strange reasons. 
• Unexplained affluence; buys things that they cannot afford on their 
household income. 
• Engages in suspicious personal contacts, such as with competitors, 
business partners, or other unauthorized individuals. 
• Overwhelmed by life crises or career disappointments. 
• Shows unusual interest in the personal lives of coworkers; asks 
inappropriate questions regarding finances or relationships. 
• Concern that they are being investigated, leaves traps to detect searches of 
their work area or home, searches for listening devices or cameras.133 
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Many people will experience several of these behaviors throughout their lifetimes 
but are able to cope with stressful situations and will not break the law by unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information. However, some who lack coping skills will be 
unable to resist the lure of wrongdoing. A supportive agency culture and employees who 
are well trained on behavioral indicators will aid in preventing unauthorized disclosures. 
As such, Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang urge the development of custodians—those 
protecting something of value who act:  
in accordance with rules and regulations supplemented by an attitude 
toward duties, superiors, peers and environment. The custodian’s attitude 
is formed as a result of family relationships, community values, education, 
professional training, circumstances of employment, fear of retribution for 
wrongdoing, or anticipation of rewards for proper behavior.134  
This application must be applied across the board—from the smallest team to the walnut 
paneled offices of the leaders in the executive branch to prevent unauthorized disclosures. 
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V. THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS— 
13 ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES COMPRISING A RANGE OF 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR USED TO ASSESS TRUSTWORTHINESS 
The personnel security clearance process is governed primarily by Executive 
Order 12968, Executive Order 13467, and the Federal Investigative Standards.135 
Individual agencies may further refine the conditions of obtaining and retaining a security 
clearance, for example the Department of Defense (DOD) Regulation 5200.2 series or the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Instruction 121–01-007, Personnel Suitability 
and Security Program. When an executive branch employee (whether military, civilian, 
or contractor) requires access to classified national security information, that individual 
must undergo a personnel security investigation (PSI) to determine eligibility to access 
such information. The investigation and subsequent adjudication process determine 
loyalty, character, trustworthiness, and reliability of the applicant.136 According to 
Defense Security Service (DSS):  
The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables 
known as the “whole person concept.” Available, reliable information 
about the individual, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, is 
considered in reaching a determination of eligibility. Eligibility for access 
is granted only where facts and circumstances indicate that access to 
classified information is consistent with the national security interests of 
the United States.137 
First, the agency must identify positions when filled requires the employee access 
to classified national security information. Once hired, the applicant completes the 
Standard Form (SF) 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, requesting an 
investigation. The extent of background information supplied by a candidate is dependent 
on the level of security clearance being requested.  
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• Top Secret—information of which unauthorized disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the 
national security.138 Background information reviews the last 10 years of 
an applicant’s life. 
This includes Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which is “classified 
information concerning, or derived from intelligence sources, methods or analytical 
process requiring handling within formal access control systems established by the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).”139 
• Secret—information of which unauthorized disclosure could reasonably 
be expected to cause serious damage to the national security,140 or  
• Confidential—information of which unauthorized disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to cause exceptional damage to the national 
security.141 Background information reviews the last five to seven years 
for both secret and confidential clearances. 
The following background information is reviewed: employment history, education, 
reference checks, military service record, foreign activities and travel, financial history, 
police records, and drug and alcohol abuse.142 
After the background investigation is completed by the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), it is sent to the Central Adjudications Facility (CAF). As defined by 
the OPM Suitability Processing Handbook, adjudication is “An examination of a person’s 
character or conduct over time, resulting in a favorable or unfavorable determination of 
their employment suitability; eligibility for access to classified information, materials, or 
areas; or for their retention in Federal employment.”143 An adjudicator at a CAF will 
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review all of the information, the “whole person” concept, and assess against the federal 
adjudicative guidelines to determine eligibility.  
• If no significant adverse information is revealed, a security clearance at 
the level requested by the agency is granted.  
• If significant, adverse material develops, a case will be delayed until 
additional information is gathered and facts are verified. Ultimately, a 
clearance may be denied.144 
The four steps of adjudication are (see Figure 1): 
• Analyze the background information, 
• Apply relevant laws, regulations, and guidelines, 
• Request additional information when needed, and 
• Communicate the recommendations and decisions regarding [the] 
clearance.145 
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Figure 1.  Overview of the Security Clearance Program146 
The 13 adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to classified 
information and eligibility to perform sensitive duties are:  
Allegiance to the United States  
Actual or threatened use of force or violence in an effort to change 
government policy, prevent government personnel from performing their 
assigned duties, or prevent others from exercising their constitutional 
rights.147 
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Foreign Influence  
Unreported personal contacts with personnel from a foreign intelligence 
service, foreign government, or persons seeking classified, proprietary, or 
other sensitive information; unreported close and continuing contact with 
a foreign national, including intimate contacts, shared living quarters, or 
marriage; or unreported relatives, or unreported contact with relatives, in a 
foreign country.148 
Foreign Preference  
Exercising benefits of dual citizenship, including possession and use of a 
foreign passport or other foreign identity documentation without 
approval.149 
Sexual Behavior  
A pattern of self-destructive or high-risk sexual behavior that the 
individual is unable to stop or criminal sexual behavior.150 
Personal Conduct  
Recurring pattern of poor judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally 
unstable behavior or deliberate omission or falsification of material 
information about background when applying for security processing.151 
Financial Considerations  
Living or spending beyond one’s means including unexplained affluence 
(unusually large or lavish purchases) or sudden large sums of cash that 
may indicate illegal source of income or bankruptcy.152 
Alcohol Consumption  
Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting to work or duty in an 
intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job or alcohol-related 
incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, 
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fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to 
alcohol use.153 
Drug Involvement  
Use, possession, or acquisition of illegal/illicit substances or misuse (use 
other than as prescribed), inappropriate possession, or inappropriate 
acquisition of prescription medication.154 
Psychological Conditions  
A pattern of significant change from past behavior, especially relating to 
increased nervousness or anxiety, unexplained depression, hyperactivity, 
decline in performance or work habits, deterioration of personal hygiene, 
increased friction in relationships with co-workers, isolating oneself by 
rejecting any social interaction, or verbal or physical threats toward work 
associates or family.155 
Criminal Conduct  
Theft, fraud, or a pattern of disregard for rules and regulations (in addition 
to theft and fraud, this includes taking classified information home at 
night, or driving while intoxicated).156 
Handling Protected Information  
Collecting or storing classified information outside approved facilities; 
revealing of classified information to unauthorized persons, including 
news media; or inappropriate, unusual, or excessive interest in classified 
information outside one’s need-to-know.157 
Outside Activities  
Failure to report paid or volunteer work for any U.S. or foreign media, 
publisher, academic institution, research organization, or corporation 
relating to the topics on which one has access to classified information.158 
 
                                                 
153 Ibid., 12. 
154 Ibid., 13. 
155 Ibid., 14. 
156 Ibid., 13. 
157 Ibid., 16. 
158 Ibid., 15. 
49 
Use of Information Technology Systems 
Unauthorized entry into any compartmented computer system; storing or 
processing classified information on any system not explicitly approved 
for classified processing; or attempting to circumvent or defeat security or 
auditing systems, without prior authorization from the system 
administrator, other than as part of a legitimate system testing or security 
research.159 
After an employee receives a security clearance, that individual will participate in 
the Continuous Evaluation Program (CEP or more often simply referred to as CE.) 
According to the Defense Security Service (DSS), “CEP involves the uninterrupted 
assessment of a person for retention of a security clearance or continuing assignment to 
sensitive duties.”160 Continuing evaluation is a critical part of the personnel security 
process. The clearance holder is subject to periodic reinvestigation (every five years for 
top secret level clearances, 10 years for secret level, and 15 years for confidential) and  
to a reasonable degree of monitoring by supervisors, co-workers, and 
security professionals between investigations. These safeguards are 
necessary because situations and behaviors change over time. Experience 
shows that individuals approved for a security clearance or position of 
trust sometimes fall into a pattern of unreliable or untrustworthy behavior 
after being granted an initial clearance.161  
Additionally, “the vital need in protect[ing] national security secrets must include 
rigorous investigation of unauthorized disclosures of classified information to identify the 
individuals who commit them, and vigorous enforcement of the applicable 
administrative, civil, and criminal provisions already available.”162 
According to a letter from Office of the Attorney General:  
The responsibility for correcting the problem of unauthorized disclosures 
of classified information falls squarely upon the shoulders of all 
Government officers and employees who are privileged to handle 
classified Government information. Department and agency heads have 
substantial authority to address the problem of persons who engage in the 
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unauthorized disclosure of classified information within their own 
organizations through suspension or revocation of clearances and 
procedures to terminate employees in the national security interests of the 
United States.163 
Personnel entrusted with safeguarding classified material are expected to report 
potentially significant, factual information that involves themselves or concerns about co-
workers that may impact a clearance.164 Examples of self-reporting requirements by 
personnel granted security clearances include: 
Change in Personal Status—Marital status (marriage, divorce), 
cohabitation (living in spouse-like relationship, intimate relationship, or 
becoming engaged), change of name  
Foreign Travel—A security briefing before any foreign travel, whether for 
personal or business reasons, clearance for travel to hazardous countries 
for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)-cleared individuals 
Foreign Contact—Contact with individuals of any foreign nationality, 
either within or outside the scope of official duties, in which illegal or 
unauthorized access to classified or otherwise sensitive information is 
sought, personal concern of being a target of an attempted exploitation, all 
close and continuing relationships between SCI-cleared individuals and 
foreign nations  
Loss or Compromise of Information—Inadvertent or accidental loss or 
compromise of classified or other sensitive information because the first 
priority in such a situation is to regain control of the classified material  
Financial Problems—Filing for bankruptcy, garnishment of wages, 
having a lien placed on property for failing to pay a creditor, eviction from 
a residence for failure to pay rent, or simply the inability to meet all 
financial obligations 
Arrests—Any arrest, regardless of whether or not charges were filed, other 
involvement with the legal system (such as being sued), any circumstance 
where sworn under oath to testify about association or involvement in 
questionable activities  
Psychological or Substance Abuse Counseling—When counseling is 
needed, seek assistance from employer-sponsored Employee Assistance 
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Program (EAP) or other counseling service. Counseling for certain 
situations need not be reported if sought the counseling on own employee 
initiative to help cope. Counseling must be reported if advised to seek 
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VI. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY TODAY 
Upon investigating the Washington Navy Yard shooting by Aaron Alexis of 
September 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) concluded technology advancements 
and access to information technology systems and reviewing open-source social media, 
financial records, and more detailed criminal records would allow for more thorough 
background investigations of clearance holders.166 The Office of the National 
Counterintelligence (ONCI) executive notes:  
Insiders convicted of espionage have, on average, been active for a 
number of years before being caught. Today more information can be 
carried out the door on removable media in a matter of minutes than the 
sum total of what was given to our enemies in hard copy throughout U.S. 
history. Consequently, the damage caused by malicious insiders will likely 
continue to increase unless we have effective insider threat detection 
programs that can proactively identify and mitigate the threats before they 
fully mature.167  
These insider threat detection programs rely heavily on improved technology, as well as a 
cultural change within the intelligence community. Policies and practices will need to be 
evaluated for effectiveness.  
The DOD, the agency that has the most positions requiring security clearances, 
has been in the forefront of creating new technology. As such, DOD researchers have 
posed five broad questions regarding analysis of an agency’s risk to insider threat: 
• Did the organization adequately account for cultural, social, political, 
legal, economic and other local pressures and stressors in its environment 
that increased the risk of insider activity across its many potential targets? 
• Did the organization lack any important policies or practices (e.g., pre-
employment screening, employee monitoring) that could have alerted it to 
the risks presented by this employee in a more timely way, deterred this 
individual, managed the risk, or prevented his or her actions? 
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• Did any of the organization’s policies and practices have unintentional 
consequences that made it harder to deter, manage, or prevent insider 
risks, or did they even increase the risk of insider actions? 
• Did the manner in which the organization enforced, or failed to enforce, 
existing policies and practices contribute to the insider’s risk? 
• How could modification of the organization’s policies and practices have 
improved the organization’s ability to prevent, detect, deter, and manage 
insider risk?168 
Most notable in leading alternative screening measures is the DOD Personnel and 
Security Research Center (PERSEREC), which has spent the better part of two decades 
developing a program called the Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES). As 
Herbig, Zimmerman, and Chandler explains:  
ACES is an automated computer system that collects data from more than 
40 government and commercial electronic records. It uses an applicant’s 
personally identifiable information (PII) obtained from the federal security 
questionnaire, the Standard Form 86 (SF-86), to check these data sources, 
verify the information that has been submitted, and leverage the 
information gathered to collect additional subject information. It applies 
business rules to analyze the data returned, produces a report that flags 
issues of potential security concern, and electronically transmits the report 
to the approved recipient—typically an adjudication facility.169 
If implemented by DOD, repeated testing by PERSEREC of ACES database 
mining has shown the security clearance and suitability vetting process can be 
streamlined while reducing costs. ACES electronic database checks can be used 
throughout an employee’s employment: between an initial background investigation and 
a periodic reinvestigation, as a tool for elements of the initial investigation or the 
reinvestigation, as a tool for prescreening military recruits, and as a tool for 
counterintelligence investigations.170 By conducting a random review of clearance 
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holders current backgrounds, this technology will assist in determining if personnel are 
loyal, trustworthy, reliable, and of good character.  
In 2013, an ACES  
pilot test with a sample of 3,370 Army service members, civilian 
employees, and contractor personnel demonstrated that ACES was able to 
identify 731 individuals with previously unreported derogatory 
information (21.7 percent of the tested population), prompting 176 
reinvestigations to resolve or adjudicate that derogatory information. Of 
this group, 99 individuals had serious derogatory information (e.g., 
financial issues, domestic abuse, drug abuse, or prostitution). Based on the 
results of this test, the Army revoked the clearances of 55 of these 
individuals and suspended the access of the remaining 44.171 
Another PERSEREC implementation is the Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit 
Tool “designed to help the user gauge an organization’s relative vulnerability to insider 
threats.”172 The tool is comprised of  
six categories of internal preventative or mitigating management activities 
and the selection of evaluation and audit questions in each category is 
based on the authors’ distillation of empirical analysis from a relatively 
large number of insider cases, academic research, and organizational 
consultations on insider challenges.173 
The six functional areas are: 
• Policies and Practices 
• Recruitment Methods 
• Pre-employment Screening  
• Effective Training and Education 
• Continuing Evaluation and Policy Implementation 
• Management Intervention174 
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A. POLICIES AND PRACTICES  
No matter how well written they are, not all policies are applicable to all agencies. 
Of equal importance is the need for employees, whether they are clearance holders or not, 
to understand their roles and responsibilities to the government and the American public. 
Employees must be encouraged and empowered to report suspicious behaviors of their 
co-workers—or changes in their own lifestyles—without fear of reprisal or lack of 
subsequent action. According to Shaw, Fischer, and Rose, authors of a 2009 PERSEREC 
report:  
Policies and Practices refers to the rules and guidelines governing 
employee behavior that have proven critical to deterring, detecting, and 
correcting potentially harmful behaviors by employees and others. Policies 
and practices can mandate employee screening, generate both human and 
IT monitoring and detection systems to enforce regulations, and establish 
guidelines for investigation and consequences when these risk behaviors 
are detected. The absence of policies and practices has actually facilitated 
insider activity and prevented successful prosecutions of significant 
insider violations. Not only should these guidelines exist, they also must 
be documented and easily accessible to employees, contractors and 
subcontractors.175 
B. RECRUITMENT METHODS  
Many agencies encourage employees to refer friends and family to apply for 
vacant agency positions. PERSEREC case data, however, has determined that often these 
personal relationships:  
bias the manner in which a hired employee is managed and often lead to 
at-risk behaviors being ignored, underreported or inadequately 
sanctioned…. [The] risk of such employees being granted exceptions to 
policies and practices [is] the detriment of the organization.176  
Shaw, Fischer, and Rose explain:  
Recruitment refers to the manner in which an organization solicits 
individuals to apply for employment. While some traditional recruitment 
methods have been extremely useful to organizations, they have also been 
implicated in some insider incidents as having contributed to an increase 
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in the risk of misconduct. These recruitment practices have included the 
use of placement groups or “body shops,” bounties, recruitment bonuses 
or employee rewards for referring recruits, and the recruitment and 
preferential hiring of employee family members or friends. While many of 
these processes may prove highly valuable in employee recruitment, in 
some cases they have exacerbated other insider risks when they have 
resulted in reduced screening or contributed to internal social networks 
that compete for employee loyalty with the organization.177 
C. PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING  
The report by Shaw, Fischer, and Rose describes:  
Pre-employment Screening [as] the manner in which organizations 
proactively examine potential employees, including contractors, 
subcontractors and temporary hires, for personal and professional history 
and characteristics related to their qualifications, fit, and risks as 
employees. Numerous subjects who committed insider misconduct would 
probably not have been hired by their organizations if prior activities and 
personal characteristics—which are the routine target of pre-employment 
screening measures—had been detected.178  
Reviewing credit reports and criminal records, contacting personal references, verifying 
education records, and informal online searches, for example, social media sites, can 
enhance the “whole person” approach to obtaining a security clearance. 
D. TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS  
The report by Shaw, Fischer, and Rose portray the importance of the effectiveness 
of training and education. They state:  
Training and Education and Evaluation of Training Effectiveness (TEE) 
refers to the way the organization provides formal training and education 
regarding its policies and practices, especially those directly related to 
insider risk. TEE also refers to the way in which the organization assesses 
the effectiveness of education and training efforts through direct 
evaluation of employee learning and skills, as well as the impact on the 
risk behaviors targeted in the education and training programs. The 
frequency with which these TEE programs are updated to take account of 
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feedback on employee learning and risk behavior and to incorporate new 
information related to insider risks is also examined.179 
E. CONTINUING EVALUATION AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  
It is necessary to continue to evaluate employees. As the authors Shaw, Fischer, 
and Rose describe:  
Continuing Evaluation and Policy Implementation refers to the manner in 
which employees are monitored for continued reliability and personnel 
security policies are implemented in the work environment. This includes 
reporting concerns about policy fairness and violations, violation 
detection, investigation and evaluation, documenting investigative results; 
determining and administering consequences; and measuring the extent to 
which policies are put into practice.180 
F. MANAGEMENT INTERVENTION: ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING  
Employee Intervention Assessment and Planning follows from Continuing 
Evaluation and addresses the manner in which managers and their multidisciplinary 
teams consider possible negative effects of disciplinary or other remedial actions with 
employees prior to the intervention. Previous research suggests that the routine 
assessment of an employee’s risk of engaging in an insider event prior to serious 
disciplinary action or other intervention is necessary when he or she has a history of 
technical violations or problems that were of a security concern. This is especially true 
prior to the employee’s departure from the workplace by involuntary or, in some cases, 
voluntary termination.181 
The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) has recommended 
combining continuous monitoring and continuous evaluation into a single system 
Continuous Monitoring and Evaluation (CME). Its 2014 report notes:  
The CME process enables the gathering of external information from 
hundreds of commercially-approved databases, which is then charted 
against the baseline SF-86/E-QIP input, other internal agency databases, 
and checks on the ‘clearance health’ of the clearance holder. Adjudicators 
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respond to discrepancies, determining whether to monitor more closely, 
intervene, or fully investigate flagged issues.182 
Bringing the trigger event to the proper authority without delay:  
requires an action be recorded and an audit train created….The driver 
behind the success of CME and ultimately an enhanced PR [Periodic 
Review] process would be the establishment of an online application and 
resultant database to replace the paper and online SF-86, SF-85P, and SF-
86C. This capability could create a centralized database from which all 
agencies could access clearance holder information, review changes in real 
time, see investigative status and ‘flags’ immediately, and enable 
portability of clearance eligibility.183  
As noted in an Intelligence and National Security Alliance report:  
CME adds context for what previously might have been viewed as an 
isolated event and a single violation of policy. By helping place triggering 
events in a larger context, it assists in making the best decision possible at 
the time and provides the audit trail for complete and appropriate 
accountability.184 
The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) program defines insider 
threat as:  
a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who meets 
the following criteria: 
• has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data 
and 
• has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner 
that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
organization’s information or information systems.185 
Silowash et al. note insiders have an advantage over outsiders who want to harm 
an agency. They explain:  
While mitigation or deterrence measures may be implemented (e.g., 
firewalls or system access) the insiders are well aware of their 
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organization’s policies, procedures, and technology. In addition, they are 
often also aware of their vulnerabilities, such as loosely enforced policies 
and procedures, or exploitable technical flaws in networks or systems.186  
No matter how effective the technology, agency employees must understand they 
are responsible for adequately securing classified national security information entrusted 
to them, including not disclosing the information to others without a need-to-know who 
may try to gain access to such information via established relationships. Indications of 
risky employees may also come via social network sites in the form of negative 
comments. Examples of this would include the Transportation Security Authority (TSA) 
employee who posted anti-Muslim and anti-gay remarks187 or the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) employee who maintained an anti-white, anti-gay website.188 
As Shaw, Fischer, and Rose report: 
These activities can pose a threat to national security, endanger the lives or 
well-being of other employees, or destroy a successful company. Such 
behaviors include espionage against the United States, theft of intangible 
assets or intellectual property, sabotage or attacks against networks and 
information systems, theft or embezzlement, illegal export of critical 
technologies, and domestic terrorism or collaboration with terrorist 
groups. While these crimes and offenses may seem dissimilar, the 
offenders themselves are frequently driven by the same motivations—
greed, disgruntlement, conflicting loyalties, ego-satisfaction—and they 
often exhibit similar early indicators or precursors of subsequent 
damaging behavior.189 
As noted by INSA, an online investigation system would improve efficiency and 
allow for cost savings. Its 2014 report states:  
Investigators no longer need to rely primarily on interviews to find out 
where a person travels, what they like, who their friends are, what they 
buy, where they live and what interests they have. Each of us has a ‘digital 
exhaust’ or footprint whether we like it or not. Unlike interviews, records 
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can be more easily verified and collectively analyzed for even 
insignificant changes. This data enables targeted interviews and expands 
potential interviewees.190 
Additionally, the report explains:  
a staggering percentage of the population “live” online and do not have 
that aspect of their lives reviewed as part of the current PR [Periodic 
Review] clearance policy. No standard exists for a ‘neighborhood check’ 
of the “online neighborhood,” which is without a fence line and extends 
beyond national borders and languages. The geographic neighborhood will 
always remain part of the PR, but information contributing to the ‘whole 
person concept’ review occurs online and is being missed.191  
Also according to the Leveraging Emerging Technologies in the Security 
Clearance Process report, “These same lifestyle changes and technologies actually make 
establishing a set period for review of five, seven or more years irrelevant and potentially 
even detrimental to national security.”192  
This becomes more and more evident as we review the cases of insider threats, 
unauthorized disclosure, and espionage. In the case of Edward Snowden, the 
unauthorized release of sensitive U.S. government information was dynamic and 
widespread because of the speed of today’s communications. Is the damage any more or 
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VII. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KNOWN OFFENDERS 
Open-source research (books, scholarly journals, newspaper articles) were 
reviewed to determine if there are behavioral characteristics common between the 
subjects: Aldrich Ames, Ana Belen Montes, Chelsea Manning, Brian Regan, Bryan 
Underwood, Greg William Bergersen, Hassan Abujihaad (formerly Paul R. Hall), Robert 
Hanssen, John Walker, Jonathon Pollard, and Edward Snowden. Better known cases had 
extensive pieces written and provided a wealth of character notes while lesser known 
persons did not.  
A. ALDRICH AMES  
A 31-year veteran with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Aldrich Ames was 
arrested in 1994 for selling classified information to the Russians beginning in 1985. 
Ames went directly to the Russian embassy in Washington, DC to begin his spying 
career. He was eventually convicted and sentenced to life in prison.193 While bank 
records show Ames was paid $1,538,685,194 it is estimated he received over $2 million in 
payment.195 Among other classified information, Ames disclosed names of Russian 
agents who had been recruited to spy for the United States. At least 10 of those agents 
were recalled to Russia and executed..196 
1. Ego and Intellect 
As a child, Ames was encouraged to learn about the finer things in life. After 
dinner, the family would listen to classical music or jazz while reading individually. By 
age 10, Ames was reading three or four books each week.197 When the family relocated 
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to the District of Columbia, Ames’ father said, “You have nothing to fear about moving 
into a new community. You are Ameses. You are special. You are smart and you will do 
well.”198 This type of encouragement from an early life most likely contributed to Ames’ 
strong ego and extremely high self-esteem. His father despised communism and talked 
about:  
the life and death struggle taking place between the free and communist 
worlds… He depicted the suppression of freedom and the brutal 
conditions of life under communist regimes as being so inhumane and 
dehumanizing that he said…he would rather see us dead than living under 
communism.199 
After Ames accepted his first $50,000 dollars from the Russians for the initial lot 
of classified information, there was no turning back. According to a book on Ames by 
Maas,  
They had said they wanted a long-lasting relationship with him. Those 
were sweet words. There was a comforting, caring quality to them, 
reflecting the kind of relationship that he had yearned for from his own 
father and never enjoyed. He was valued!200 
Ames was very successful at being deceptive. During his period of spying, he was able to 
pass two polygraph exams “which specifically addressed unauthorized contacts and 
disclosures of foreign nationals….”201 
2. Addiction 
Ames had an addiction to alcohol. When interviewed by Pete Earley, who had 
access alone with him for over 50 hours, Ames said,  
Drinking has always been a struggle for me. I have vacillated between 
considering myself beyond self-help and total denial…. For many years… 
                                                 
198 Ibid., 24 
199 Ibid., 28. 
200 Peter Maas, Killer Spy: The inside Story of the FBI’s Pursuit and Capture of Aldrich Ames, 
America’s Deadliest Spy (New York: Warner Books, 1995), 58. 
201 Ibid., 133. 
65 
I seldom drank liquor, only beer and wine, which gave me plenty of 
opportunities to feel high and, often, drunk.202 
For a time, Ames hid his addiction. He narrates for Earley:  
…my first wife seldom drank more than a glass of wine at dinner and we 
never drank at home at all. I would go to parties and sometimes get a 
definite high. The drinking got more serious in NY [New York] and on 
foreign trips. It wasn’t boredom or loneliness that made me drink, rather 
the attraction was having a timeout period just for myself, when I could 
relax and lose myself for an afternoon or evening. I always took care to 
arrange these binges at times when I didn’t need to work and would not be 
called. Typically, I would just sit in a hotel room with a book and read and 
drink myself to sleep, consuming most of a fifth of vodka or cognac in one 
sitting. I don’t think anyone at the agency new about this binge drinking 
when I was traveling.203 
3. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
Ames “started working for the CIA when he was sixteen, a summer stint filing 
records after finishing up his sophomore year in high school….”204 However, by 1980, 
Ames began to lose interest in working for the CIA, stating, “All the CIA wanted to do 
was catch spies, it really didn’t want useful intelligence.”205  
After Ames was captured, one Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employee 
questioned how Ames could betray his friends,  
What really amazed me about Rick is that I thought he had a feeling of 
loyalty to the people whom he dealt with and that is the betrayal that I 
can’t understand—the personal betrayal. I can understand why he didn’t 
have any loyalty to the agency. I can understand how he could have lost 
his way so that there came a point when it didn’t matter to him if he was 
the recruiter or the recruitee. But what I can’t understand is how he lost his 
loyalty not only to his co-workers, such as me, but his friends, people like 
Sergey Fedorenko [one of the agents who was executed]! How can you 
ever justify betraying the people closest to you? [R. Patrick Watson]206 
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A friend from high school believes that overall Ames was an anxious person. She 
explains: 
Here is my hypothesis. Rickie is drawn to the CIA. His father worked 
there and he sees the agency as having a certain glamour. But then he gets 
into it, and he discovers that it is a government bureaucracy just like all 
the other government bureaucracies. Now some are good, but most are 
filled with time servers—people who get promoted because they have 
been there a long time or they have rubbed the right apple. I can see 
Rickie, who was always very creative but never good in a bureaucratic 
setting, not doing well and waking up one day and saying to himself, is 
this how I should spend my life? The sad thing about Rickie is that I don’t 
think he would have had the gumption to do what any decent person 
would have done at that point, which is simply to get out. You see, Rickie 
always avoided confrontation, and I think basically that behind his mask, 
he is a fearful person. This is not wimpiness. Obviously he took a lot of 
risks being a spy. So I don’t mean that. Rather it is a basic gutlessness—an 
inability to take his life in his own hands and take responsibility for his 
own actions. [Margaret “Peggy” Anderson]207 
Ames was stationed in Mexico City where he met his second wife Rosario, a 
Columbian citizen. As they courted, he began to recognize how alienated he felt from the 
United States, stating, “I feel nothing but complete revulsion for most aspects of popular 
culture in the United States.’”208 
4. Security Concerns 
Ames had a history of security violations, but he was rarely if ever admonished. 
Ames submitted notification to the CIA that he planned to live with Rosario, a necessary 
proclamation given her foreign citizenship. When the marriage was announced, the chief 
of counterintelligence recommended Ames be moved to a less sensitive job—one that did 
not allow access to the highest classified secrets. In common bureaucratic fashion, this 
concern never went further than the director of personnel, who believed it was not his 
decision to make. So the issue never went further.209 At a CIA Christmas party Ames 
“was found drunkenly copulating with a CIA secretary on an agency desk-and on another 
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occasion being serviced orally.”210 He was not reprimanded for either incident. Maas 
describes: 
In the twenty-twenty hindsight concerning Rick in Rome, there was an 
avalanche of reports about Rick drinking his lunch, staggering back to his 
office unable to function, that he had been reprimanded (verbally) for his 
alcohol dependency, that he had been counseled ‘in an almost sheepish 
way’ by the station manager to seek help, that he was ‘one of the worst 
drunks in the outfit….’211 
5. Financial Concerns 
Not only did Ames have an issue with alcohol, but he also had an issue with 
excessive spending. As a result of extravagant spending, Ames became stressed from 
excessive debt. When asked why he sold classified information he replied:  
That’s a damn good question. At the time, I told myself that I was doing it 
for the money. And that is what I still tell people. I say, “Let’s be clear 
about this. There is no question. I did it for the money.” But now I am 
wondering if that is really an accurate answer. Was it just for the money? 
Or was getting the money just a way for me to excuse or justify what I had 
wanted to do all along? Why did I immediately think that I had to do 
something illegal? I never even thought about sitting down with a credit 
counselor. Why did I descend immediately into thinking of selling out my 
country? Why? Now that is the real question, isn’t it? Why did this 
betrayal come so easily to me? I just don’t know. Let me think.’212 
In prison, Ames disclosed to Earley that he was motivated by fear and profit and, 
to a certain extent, by insecurity. He confessed, “I personally felt alienated from my own 
culture. I did not feel any sense of loyalty to what mass culture had become. I did not feel 
part of our society.”213  
Why did I do it? I did it for the money. Period. I am not lying. I wanted 
the cash. But the reason I needed the money was not for the reasons most 
people want money. I did not want it for a new car or a new house, but 
rather for what it could guarantee. It seemed to be the only way for me to 
guarantee that the ‘us’ [his relationship with Rosario] I desired so 
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desperately would survive. It would make ‘us’ possible and, therefore, 
make our love a lasting one. I wanted a future. I wanted what I saw we 
could have together…. So you see, my turning to the KGB was actually a 
great act of cowardice. I decided to let the KGB worry about keeping me 
safe. I decided not to deal with the enormity of what I had done…it was a 
quick and easy way for me to get a sense of relief.214  
He continued: 
…I have always quietly doubted myself, my own self-worth, and I was 
afraid to risk losing what I had. This is my innermost fear—that those who 
claim to love me will walk away once they see who I really am.215 
“[Money] said Rick Ames was not a failure.”216 
Duffy uses Ames’s own words to describe Ames:  
Introverted and essentially a loner, in family surroundings that placed a 
premium on good manners, where private feelings and thoughts were not 
to be intruded upon, Rick found it difficult to reach out to others. If they 
reached out to him, however, he responded with some charm. It was a trait 
that would accompany him throughout his life.217  
Duffy’s analysis of Ames’ relationship with Rosario contains most all of Ames’ 
own words,  
In many respects, he’s an emotionless person, but when it comes to her, 
it’s different. There’s a perverse need he had for her and she fulfilled it. 
He’ll well up emotionally about her, and that’s about all he wells up about. 
Of course, at that time, when he met her, she was a lot more attractive 
physically. He was suffering from incredible low self-esteem, having lost 
in effect one woman, and at his age was in sort of a midlife crisis. Then 
along she comes, breathing new life into him both sexually and 
intellectually. And between the boozing and losing his first wife and sense 
of worth, she made him feel he was somebody again….218  
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Maas remarks about Ames, “But he confessed that what had propelled him was 
greed. Money. Rosario. He confessed, though, that he had gotten a ‘rush’ out of what he 
was doing.”219 
B. ANA BELEN MONTES 
Working as a senior analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Ana 
Belen Montes spied for the Cuban government for 16 years. Montes was openly against 
U.S. foreign policy towards central America.  
Counterintelligence officials say Montes had access to a range of U.S. 
military and intelligence secrets of interest to Havana and to terrorist 
groups and regimes allied with Castro. She allegedly betrayed the identity 
of a U.S. intelligence officer in Cuba, provided classified details about 
U.S. Navy war games and compromised a Special Action Program (SAP) 
so sensitive that she was one of only two people who knew about it. 
Equally if not more importantly, Montes wrote or influenced intelligence 
reports that might have corrupted U.S. perceptions of Cuban subversive 
capabilities, operations and intentions.220  
However, Montes received only nominal financial remuneration for expenses. She was 
recruited by Cuban foreign intelligence officers who felt she would be sympathetic with 
their cause.221 At the time of recruitment, Montes was 44 years old, single, lived alone, 
had few friends, and spoke fluent Spanish.222 Montes pled guilty in 2002 and was 
sentenced to prison for 25 years.223 
1. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
At the time of her sentencing, Montes said she spied purely for political and 
ideological reasons. She explains her reasons,  
I obeyed my conscience rather than the law. I believe our government’s 
policy is cruel and unfair, profoundly unneighborly, and I felt morally 
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obligated to help the island defend itself from our efforts to impose our 
values and our political system on it.224  
Montes continued to explain, quoting an Italian proverb, “all the world is one 
country,” as she:  
defended her actions Wednesday as a necessary antidote to the 40-year-old 
U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, imposed by President Kennedy after the 
revolutionary Castro seized billions of dollars’ worth of U.S. assets, 
stating “I did what I thought was right to counter a grave injustice,” and “I 
hope my case in some way will encourage our government to abandon its 
hostility toward Cuba.”225 
Montes also refused to formally apologize for her actions, leaving prosecutors 
disappointed. “I felt morally obligated to help the island defend itself from our efforts to 
impose our values and our political system on it,” she said. “We have displayed 
intolerance and contempt toward Cuba for most of the last four decades. We have never 
respected Cuba’s right to make its own journey toward its own ideals of equality and 
justice.”226 In his book on Montes, Popkin narrates:  
She was a leftist with a soft spot for bullied nations. She was bilingual and 
had dazzled her DOJ [Department of Justice] supervisors with her 
ambition and smarts. But most important, she had top-secret security 
clearance and was on the inside. “I hadn’t thought about actually doing 
anything until I was propositioned,” Montes admitted to investigators. The 
Cubans “tried to appeal to my conviction that what I was doing was right” 
[emphasis added].’227 
2. Childhood Upbringing 
Montes graduated from high school with a 3.9 grade point average. But home-life 
proved troublesome and a growing emotional distance was occurring between Montes 
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and her father, Alberto. “To outsiders, Alberto was a caring and well-educated father of 
four. But behind closed doors, he was short-tempered and bullied his children. Alberto 
‘happened to believe that he had the right to beat his kids,’” Montes explained when 
undergoing psychological tests.228 She expounded to her caseworker that her father “was 
the king of the castle and demanded complete and total obedience.”229 Speaking to the 
caseworker, Montes’ “sister said child abuse began at five years of age and their father 
had a violent temper. ‘Ana’s mother feared taking on her mercurial husband, but as the 
verbal and physical abuse persisted, she divorced him and gained custody of their 
children.’”230 
Montes CIA profile stated: “Ana was 15 when her parents separated, but the 
damage had been done. Montes’ childhood made her intolerant of power differentials, led 
her to identify with the less powerful, and solidified her desire to retaliate against 
authoritarian figures.”231 Her “arrested psychological development” and the abuse she 
suffered at the hands of a temperamental man she associated with the U.S. military 
“increased her vulnerability to recruitment by a foreign intelligence service….”232 
Montes’ sister commented that even in childhood, “She wasn’t one that wanted to share 
things or talk about things.”233 
As a result of her experiences Montes only confidents were her Cuban handlers. 
An article by Popkin explains:  
At the beginning, the Cubans provided enough of a social life. “They were 
emotionally supportive. They understood my loneliness,” Montes told 
investigators. But as she turned 40, Montes became despondent. “I was 
finally ready to share my life with someone but was leading a double life, 
so I did not feel I could live happily,” she revealed [emphasis added].234  
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When contact was briefly interrupted, Montes’ experienced severe emotional trauma. 
Popin remarks in his article, “CIA-led psychologists would later conclude that the 
isolation, lies, and fear of capture had triggered borderline obsessive-compulsive 
traits.”235 
Montes’s sister wrote of her betrayal,  
You betrayed your family, you betrayed all your friends. Everyone who 
loves you was betrayed by you. You betrayed your co-workers and your 
employer, and you betrayed your nation. You worked for an evil 
megalomaniac who shares or sells our secrets to our enemies.236  
Her sister believes Montes ultimately committed unauthorized disclosure to obtain power 
over other people, in order for her to feel powerful. Rather than seeking power, Montes 
may have become emotionally attached to her Cuban handlers to fulfill a feeling of 
security that she did not have as a child.  
Montes was highly successful at work, lived modestly; she did not suffer from 
any known addiction, nor did she have financial problems. Additionally, she did not have 
a history of security concerns aside from two security interviews in which she 
acknowledged her disagreement with U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. The foreign 
policy issue was an emotional one for her.237  
C. CHELSEA (FORMERLY BRADLEY) MANNING 
While serving as an intelligence analyst in the U.S. Army in Iraq in 2009 and 
2010, Chelsea Manning released more than 700,000 classified files, combat videos and 
diplomatic cables to Wikileaks, an online anti-secrecy group. Her motivation appears to 
be disillusionment with the world affairs of the U.S. government about what she learned 
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in Iraq and a resultant questioning of U.S. foreign policy.238 Arrested in May 2010, 
Manning was found guilty of 20 of 21 charges in 2013 and sentenced to 35 years in 
prison.  
1. Ego and Intellect 
Manning was highly computer literate, but a former supervisor said she was weak 
on the social side of analyzing intelligence.239 She currently suffers from serious 
emotional problems that were also prevalent during her youth (feeling profoundly 
alienated and fearful about her secret). She has always been a loner, physically weak, and 
suffered from a stunted personality. 
2. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
From written conversations with the computer hacker who reported her to 
authorities, Manning talked about feeling isolated, suffering from mental instability, and 
from gender identity disorder.240 Working as an intelligence analyst in Iraq, Manning:  
began to become depressed with the situation that [the United States 
became] increasingly mired in year after year. [She] felt that [the United 
States] were risking so much for people that seemed unwilling to 
cooperate with us, leading to frustration and anger on both sides.241  
She seemed to be losing connections with those closest around her. She no longer 
communicated with her father and her relationship with her boyfriend had ended.  
Gender identity issues were a major source of stress for Manning. She came out 
as transgender and in an email sent to her supervisor in 2010 stating she joined the Army 
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to “to get rid of it.”242 “You put him in this hyper-masculine environment, if you will, 
with little support and few coping skills—the pressure would have been difficult to say 
the least,” testified an Army mental health counselor who counseled Manning in Iraq. 
U.S. Army Captain Michael Worsley, a psychiatrist who interviewed Manning after her 
arrest, believes she has symptoms of fetal alcohol syndrome and Asperger syndrome, as 
well as narcissistic traits that become worse with stress. Manning was “acting out his 
grandiose idealation,” and was convinced that she could change the world.243  
Manning, frustrated by countries acting only in self-interest, told the court she 
leaked the documents to start a public debate about the role of the United States military 
and foreign policy.244 Manning “found the machinations of first world governments 
‘exploiting’ third world ones to be disgusting, and hoped ‘worldwide discussion, debates, 
and reforms’ would result from the release of the documents she passed on.”245 At her 
trial, her statement read:  
I understand that my actions violate the law. It was never my intent to hurt 
anyone. I only wanted to help people. When I chose to disclose classified 
information, I did so out of a love for my country and a sense of duty for 
others.  
3. Security Concerns 
When stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona in 2008, Manning was reprimanded 
for posting YouTube videos that revealed sensitive information.246 Moving to Fort Drum 
in August to train for deployment, Manning was again reprimanded for yelling at fellow 
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soldiers and throwing furniture.247 Becoming increasingly isolated while deployed in 
2009, Manning began to act out. After striking another soldier, she was demoted from 
specialist to private first class.248 Prior to the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” Manning 
was posting photos with her boyfriend and attending gay rights rallies.249 One week after 
the breakup with her boyfriend, Manning was found in a fetal position, clutching a knife, 
having etched “I want” into a chair.250 
4. Childhood Upbringing 
Manning grew up in rural Oklahoma, the child of alcoholic, abusive parents, and 
possibly is a victim of fetal alcohol syndrome.251 As a child, she was high strung and 
extremely intelligent.252 She considered herself “very effeminate” and “very 
intelligent.”253 By kindergarten, she was teased at school and at home. Other students 
called her a “girly boy” or teacher’s pet.” She retreated into her room to learn things. She 
explained, “My favorite things growing up were reading my encyclopaedia, watching 
PBS (the only channel I could get on my TV), building with legos, and playing on my 
dad’s hand-me-down computers.”254  
Manning’s mother filed for divorce after her father threatened her with a shotgun 
for making too much noise.255 She later attempted suicide. Upon recovery, she and 
Manning moved to her mother’s hometown in Wales, United Kingdom. Several years 
later, Manning returned to the United States after her mother began having strokes.256 By 
this time, Manning had come to terms that she was a homosexual. Her father kicked her 
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out of the house for being gay and after a series of failed jobs, she joined the Army in 
October 2007, although the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy was in effect.257  
D. BRIAN REGAN 
Brian Regan worked as a defense contractor for the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO). His intent was to collect and sell classified information concerning U.S. 
reconnaissance satellites to Iraq, China, and Libya.258 However, unable to find a buyer 
for the large volume of classified information he had amassed, Regan buried it. At his 
trial, officials displayed piles of boxes marked “top secret that contained estimated 
10,000–20,000 pages of sensitive material, including documents, slides, and videos, some 
of which pertain to satellites and early warning systems.”259 In 2003, he was found guilty 
of attempted espionage and gathering national defense information and sentenced to life 
in prison.260 
1. Ego and Intellect 
Although challenged by dyslexia, Regan illustrated a high level of intelligence by 
overcoming that disability and undertaking a long-term plan to sell U.S. classified 
information. He stole thousands of documents, buried them in 19 locations in Maryland 
and Virginia, and developed a “series of codes, marked trees, and carefully buried 
packages that would allow agents of China, Libya, or Iraq to directly retrieve the 
materials secretly.”261 In the Air Force, Regan had been trained in cryptanalysis and to 
use that skill to create manual code and ciphers; he was able to maintain a guide to where 
the documents were hidden.  
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Regan was disillusioned about his and his family’s financial future. In letters to 
foreign government dictators, he detailed his anger at the small pension he would receive 
after a 20-year Air Force career compared to the millions celebrities made after just a few 
years.262 He was amassing debt as his wife was still in college and they had had four 
children to raise. 
3. Financial Concerns 
Regan is attributed to having:  
credit card debts of $117,000 when he drafted a letter to [Saddam 
Hussein] offering to sell U.S. intelligence for $13 million. He made 
similar offers to Chinese and Libyan officials, though… he never actually 
passed any information. Regan was carrying information with the coded 
coordinates of Iraqi and Chinese missile sites, the missiles that were stored 
there, and the dates the information was obtained. He also had the 
addresses of the Chinese and Iraqi embassies in Switzerland and Austria in 
his wallet and tucked into his right shoe.263  
Regan was arrested at Dulles Airport in August 2001 as he was preparing to board a 
flight to Zurich,264 although he had told his colleagues that he was taking his family to 
Disney World.265 
4. Childhood Upbringing 
Regan was born dyslexic and “grew up feeling stupid, comparing himself to other 
kids because of the grades he got,” according to a psychiatrist who interviewed and 
counseled him in jail. He was also socially awkward; however, upon joining the Air 
Force he was able to improve his education listening to audiobooks.266 
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E. BRYAN UNDERWOOD  
A former U.S. Marine, Bryan Underwood, attempted to pass classified national 
security information to China while working as a contract security guard at a U.S. 
consulate under construction in China.267 Arraigned in September 2011, Underwood was 
sentenced for a period of nine years268 in August 2012 of attempting to communicate 
national defense information to a foreign government.269 That information would have 
given China undetected access to the consulate, to include the secure areas, by providing 
photographs of the construction, a list of security upgrades, and locations of surveillance 
security cameras. He never got to put on paper his mental plan of where listening devices 
could be installed.270 
1. Financial Concerns 
In March 2011, Underwood became panicked about his financial situation when 
his stock brokerage account fell from $68,813 to negative $89,624 in two months.271 It 
was then that Regan tried to contact the Chinese Ministry of State Security to offer the 
classified photographs, information, and access to U.S. facilities for $3 million to $5 
million.272  
2. Childhood Upbringing 
At sentencing, the judge cited Underwood’s mental problems and troubled 
childhood as reasons for giving him a more lenient sentence. Underwood himself said he 
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was a paranoid schizophrenic undergoing mental health treatment,273 but this could not 
be substantiated through additional literature.  
F. GREG WILLIAM BERGERSEN  
While working as a weapons systems policy analyst at the Department of 
Defense, Greg Bergersen sold classified national defense information to Tai Kuo, a 
naturalized citizen from Taiwan who was also an agent of the People’s Republic of 
China.274 The information, primarily related to the sale of military sales to Taiwan275 and 
U.S. military communications security, was then passed on to China. Kuo cultivated a 
friendship with Bergersen, giving him gifts, cash payments, dinners, and money for 
gambling trips. He also led Bergersen to believe that he would involve him with a 
company selling U.S. defense technology to Taiwan after Bergersen retired from 
government service.276 In February 2008, Bergersen was charged with conspiracy to 
disclose national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it277 and pled 
guilty to the conspiracy charge in March 2008. He was sentenced to 57 months in 
prison.278 
1. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
Bergersen believed Kuo worked the Taiwanese government279 and the 
information was being sold to Taiwan, rather than China, which does not recognize 
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Taiwan as an independent country. Regardless, he knew he was committing a crime. As 
was noted in an article for Biotech Business Week, “Mr. Bergersen predicted he would go 
to jail if anyone discovered he was unlawfully providing classified information to a 
foreign government.”280 According to a wiretapped conversation with Kuo, Bergersen 
said “If [the classified information] ever fell into the wrong hands, and I know it’s not 
going to, then I’d be fired for sure. I, I’d go to jail.”281 
2. Financial Concerns 
While monetary gains seem to be the main motive for selling secrets, Bergersen 
appears to have received only minimal payment. In July 2007, Kuo placed $3,000 in 
Bergersen’s shirt pocket in order to access the details of five years’ worth of planned 
weapons sales to Taiwan. The papers had jagged edges where Bergersen had removed the 
“classified” markings.282 Bergersen has acknowledged receiving $3,000 in cash for 
gambling and show tickets worth $875 in Las Vegas in February 2008.283 Bergersen’s 
long-term goal that was never achieved was to become a partner/co-owner of a company 
selling U.S. military technology to Taiwan. 
G. HASSAN ABU-JIHAAD (FORMERLY PAUL R. HALL) 
While serving as a U.S. Navy signalman aboard a warship in 2001, Hassan Abu-
Jihaad (“father of jihad” in Arabic),284 formerly known as Paul R. Hall, was a 
homegrown extremist who shared details of ship vulnerabilities and scheduled 
movements of several warships with Al-Qaeda.285 Abu-Jihaad also sent messages 
supporting Osama bin Laden, praising the attack on the United States ship (USS) Cole in 
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October 2000 that killed 17 Americans while stationed in the port of Yemen. Over the 
Internet, he ordered various materials supporting jihad.286 Abu-Jihaad was arrested in 
March 2007 and charged with materially aiding terrorism with intent to kill U.S. citizens, 
as well as transmitting classified information to those not authorized to receive it.287 In 
March 2008, he was tried and convicted of providing material support to terrorists and of 
disclosing classified national defense information. He was sentenced to 10 years in 
prison.288 
1. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
While stationed on the USS Benfield, Abu-Jihaad communicated with anonymous 
jihadists over the Azzam Publications website (an English language Islamist website). He 
expressed enthusiasm for Islam, as well as writings on terror tactics:  
[Referring to Islamist fighters in one of his videos] with their only mission 
in life to make Allah’s name and mission supreme all over the world, I 
want to let it be known that I have been in the middle east for almost a 
total of 3 months [that is, while onboard the USS Benfield]. For those 3 
months you can truly see the effect of this psychological warfare taking a 
toll on junior and high ranking officers… [they were] running around like 
headless chickens very afraid (United States District Court of Connecticut, 
Warrant, 2007).289 
In one email he called the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 a “martyrdom operation” and 
praised “the men who have brong (sic) honor ... in the lands of jihad Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Chechnya, etc.”290 
2. Childhood Upbringing 
Paul R. Hall was raised in San Bernardino, California and joined the U.S. Navy at 
19. In 1997, Hall converted to Islam, taking the name Hassan Abu-Jihaad.291  
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H. ROBERT HANSSEN 
Working as an intelligence analyst for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Robert Hanssen provided classified information to Soviet and Russian intelligence 
officials between 1979 and 2001. Arrested in 2001, Hanssen was charged with espionage 
and conspiracy to commit espionage. He was convicted of 15 counts of espionage the 
same year and was sentenced to 15 consecutive life sentences.292 According to the 2003 
Department of Justice (DOJ) report, Hanssen’s initial decision to engage in espionage  
arose from a complex blend of factors, including low self-esteem and a 
desire to demonstrate intellectual superiority, a lack of conventional moral 
restraints, a feeling that he was above the law, a lifelong fascination with 
espionage and its trappings and a desire to become a “player” in that 
world, the financial rewards he would receive, and the lack of 
deterrence—a conviction that he could “get away with it.”293 
1. Ego and Intellect 
Highly educated and a good student, Hanssen resented not being properly 
recognized and promoted because of his skills. Additionally, he longed to prove to his 
colleagues that he was cleverer than they thought.294 His egotistic tendencies were 
demonstrated when arrested in February 2001 and he asked the FBI agents, “What took 
you so long?”295 He was known for wearing dark suits, and co-workers referred to him as 
Dr. Doom. He sensed he was never going to be promoted to one of the top jobs in the 
FBI, and he resented it. He was not one of the boys.296 
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The Russian intelligence officers were able to play to Hanssen’s “insecurity, 
vanity, desire for power and control, and yearning for friendship,” stroking his ego to 
obtain United States’ classified secrets. In 2003 article, Bauerle remarked,  
For his part, Hanssen compartmentalized his thoughts and feelings, 
reasoning that he had betrayed no one, having instead expanded the circle 
of his friends to include those who played the intelligence game at a 
higher level than the FBI, just as he did.297 
2. Addiction 
Hanssen appears to have had a sexual deviancy involving kinky sex. When his 
closest friend went overseas with the U.S. Army, Hanssen sent him nude photos of his 
wife and later video-tapes of his wife and him having sexual intercourse. His wife was 
not aware this was happening.298 Eventually, Hanssen set up a video camera in their 
bedroom so when his friend visited, he could watch the Hanssens in their bedroom. This 
was done at Hanssen’s urging, his friend never requested to see intimate encounters. 
Believing that his friend’s life was empty since he did not have a child, Hanssen 
suggested drugging his wife with a “date rape” drug so his friend could impregnate 
her.299 Hanssen eventually befriended a local stripper, whom he showered with gifts, 
including expensive jewelry, a Mercedes, a laptop computer, and cash.300 
3. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
After marriage, Hanssen converted to Catholicism and became a member of Opus 
Dei, a secretive Catholic organization. According to Baumann:  
Opus Dei…members lead a kind of double life; to the world, they are 
successful doctors or lawyers, distinguished only by their professional 
skills and autonomy; off the job they must not only engage in an intense 
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life of prayer (all to the good) but be strictly accountable to those above 
them in ‘the work’ (more problematic).301  
This double-agent quality may have appealed to Hanssen, whose career had been mainly 
in counterespionage. In his book, Bauman muses:  
Professionally, he seems to have put great stock in his intellectual and 
moral superiority over those around him. Hanssen’s contempt for the 
bungling of his fellow FBI and CIA agents seems to have been linked to 
his disdain for the godlessness, materialism, and sexual license of 
American society.302 
Hanssen tried to recruit others to become Roman Catholic, and he was vocal 
regarding anti-Communism and licentious behavior. Hanssen “preached to all who would 
listen that man is lost without religion, which is why the Soviet Union—run by godless 
Communists—would ultimately fail.”303 Yet here was a man who did not honor what the 
Roman Catholic Church taught, was supporting those he calls godless, and practicing 
sexually deviant behavior. 
Hanssen himself speaks of his psychological conflicts. In March 2000, he wrote to 
his handlers,  
I have come about as close as I ever want to come to sacrificing myself to 
help you. Conclusion: One might propose that I am either insanely brave 
or quite insane. I’d answer neither. I’d say, insanely loyal. Take your pick. 
There is insanity in all the answers.304 
4. Security Concerns 
Hanssen’s knowledge of FBI culture allowed him to practice unauthorized 
disclosure without detection. A DOJ report documents:  
First, Hanssen was capable of being uniquely reactive to 
counterintelligence investigations because of his placement within the FBI 
counterintelligence bureaucracy. Second, Hanssen was able to alter his 
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contact procedures with his Russian associates whenever he felt that he 
was close to being caught; he was even able to search for his own name 
within the FBI internal database to monitor whether he was the subject of 
any investigation.305  
In his book Spy, Wise notes, “Third, Hanssen knew how to avoid movement within the 
FBI bureaucracy that would have subjected him to polygraph examinations.”306 
5. Financial Concerns 
Hanssen had financial motivators for selling secrets, although he continued to live 
within his means. He had a large family to provide for. In November 1985, Hanssen 
engaged Russian intelligence officers and volunteered to provide information “for 
money, a few diamonds for his children and good will.”307 Overall, Hanssen received 
more than half a million dollars in cash and $50,000 in diamonds. He was also told that 
$800,000 waited for him in a Russian bank account. It appears he harbored a fantasy of 
retiring from the FBI and teaching college courses in Moscow.308 However, Hanssen 
recognized the difficulty of sudden affluence, writing on his Russian contact on March 3, 
1986: 
As far as more funds are concerned, I have little need or utility for more 
than the $100,000. It merely provides a difficulty since I cannot spend it, 
store it or invest it easily without (tripping the FBI’s) “drug money” 
warning bells. Perhaps some diamonds as security to my children and 
some good will so that when the time comes, you will accept (my) senior 
services as a guest lecturer. Eventually, I would appreciate an escape plan. 
Nothing lasts forever.309 
6. Childhood Upbringing 
Hanssen’s father was a harsh disciplinarian and verbally and physically abusive. 
He continuously berated Hanssen, telling him he would never amount to anything. While 
his father hoped Hanssen would become a doctor, Hanssen dropped out of dental school 
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and pursued a master’s of business administration before entering into law enforcement. 
As a result of the abuse, Hanssen’s court-appointed psychoanalyst believed Hanssen 
possessed an enormous fear of being perceived by his wife and family as inadequate or a 
failure. He craved the financial success his father wished of him and feared that he had 
not measured up.310 As said by the psychoanalyst, “the prime motive for his spying was 
to preserve his image in Bonnie’s [his wife] eyes as a good provider.”311 
I. JOHN WALKER 
In 1968, while serving in the U.S. Navy, John Walker walked into the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington, DC and offered to sell classified nuclear information. Walker 
said later “the theft was an impulsive act caused by his deep depression over his marital 
and financial problems.”312 During the 18-year period in which he sold information, 
Walker enlisted his brother, his best friend, and his son to steal classified information for 
him. Walker’s ex-wife and daughter eventually went to authorities to discuss the 
relationship Walker had with the Russians. In May 1985, Walker was arrested. He pled 
guilty to espionage and was sentenced to life in prison.313 
1. Ego and Intellect 
When Walker was given access to classified nuclear information, he began to 
wonder what it might be worth. Because of the constant awareness briefings to protect 
classified information, he felt that it might be worth something to the Russians.314 
Growing up with a troubled childhood and later a troubled marriage, he was determined 
to move quickly up the enlisted ranks in the Navy. 
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Walker befriended people who admired him and whom he felt he could 
manipulate,315 allowing for feelings of greater self-worth. His Russian handler was able 
to stroke his ego, telling him, “You are the most experienced, the very best.”316 
Walker was concerned about being able to undergo scrutiny during his security 
clearance reinvestigation since he was already selling secrets to the Soviets. Therefore, he 
resourcefully decided to forge his own security clearance. Comparing his and another 
sailor’s paperwork, he noticed the only difference was the FBI stamp on the completed 
file. Walker traced the stamp, drove to an office supply store and paid $2.97 for a 
duplicated stamp. He was able to forge his paperwork and did not have to undergo 
periodic reinvestigation.317 
Upon his arrest, Walker was incensed his spying skills were not used by the 
United States. He fumes: “Here I was, a person who had run a successful, perhaps the 
most successful spy ring in the nation’s history, and all these bastards were worried about 
was getting out a goddamn press release. Getting public attention was more important 
than using me as a double agent.”318 
2. Addiction 
Born to an alcoholic father, Walker also became addicted to alcohol and often 
used drugs. It is remarkable Walker was able to function as a spy at such a high level 
given the frequency he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.  
3. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
About becoming a spy, Walker explains:  
I decided that if I was going to be a spy, and I clearly was going to be one, 
then I would be the best damn spy there ever was, and that meant giving 
them everything. And that’s exactly what I did.319 
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I really went through several periods as a spy. In the beginning, I felt like I 
was going to be caught any minute. There was a lot of fear, but after a 
couple years, I got into a what-the-fuck-is-happening mode. How can this 
be—that I’m not being arrested? It just didn’t make any sense that I hadn’t 
been captured, Then, after I’d been in California for a while, I began to 
enjoy myself. There was a certain thrill to it all and a metamorphosis 
began to take place. I began to realize that the FBI is not like it is on 
television. You see, the FBI doesn’t really do any investigating. The FBI 
is not powerful at all because its agents are really just bureaucrats and they 
have the same inherent ineptitude of all government bureaucrats. All they 
do is spend their days waiting for some snitch to call them and turn 
someone in.320 
Walker eventually came to feel that sharing information with the Russians 
prevented another world war. He said,  
I really didn’t harm the country. Lots of people do it [spy]. In fact, the 
material I provided them probably avoided World War III, because the 
information was so good the Soviets were convinced we were as strong as 
we said we were. That’s why they never attacked us, and never will.321 
4. Security Concerns 
Walker (not his brother or best friend) received security clearance 
reinvestigations322 and Walker forged his own background investigation at one time. 
Walker had serious financial debt, but once he started selling secrets he maintained a 
lavish lifestyle. When queried about his lavish lifestyle, he attributed his wealth to a side 
restaurant/bar business, which actually was heavily mortgaged.323 His charismatic 
personality convinced co-workers that his business was doing well. However, even when 
some began to realize something was wrong, noting, for example, Walker seemed 
nervous and flush with money and held a security clearance, he was never 
investigated.324 
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5. Financial Concerns 
When interviewed, Walker stated, “I became a spy because I needed the 
money.”325 He eventually asked the Russians to consider giving him a $1 million 
payment in return for a steady supply of documents during the next 10 years.326 Upon his 
initial approach to the Russian embassy, the Russian intelligence officer asked if Walker 
came for political or financial reasons,” and Walker responded, “Purely financial. I need 
the money.”327 
Walker’s desire to live a lavish lifestyle overrode his responsibility to protect 
national security information. His greed and ego overruled caution even moments before 
his arrest. Rather than destroy instructions on where to drop a package of information and 
receive a $200,000 payment, Walker was apprehended with the instructions.328 
6. Childhood Upbringing 
Walker had a troubled upbringing. His life was greatly altered after his father was 
in a serious car accident and no longer able to adequately support his family. His father 
was a severe alcoholic who physically abused his wife and children to the point where 
Walker plotted to kill his father to end the family’s suffering. His best friend described 
Walker’s mother as “cold and distant and [Walker] complained that she hadn’t spent 
much time with him as a boy.”  
As a teen, Walker became involved in petty burglaries and robberies. He joined 
the Navy as an option instead of going to prison for one robbery. The failures of his 
father and the lack of attention from his mother had a serious effect on Walker. He was 
determined to provide for his family (wife and children)329 and was insistent he was not 
going to end up destitute like his father.330 
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J. JONATHON POLLARD 
While working for the U.S. Navy as an intelligence specialist, Jonathon Pollard 
sold classified national security information to Israel. Arrested outside of the Israeli 
Embassy while trying to seek asylum in November 1985, Pollard pled guilty to 
conspiracy to deliver national defense information to a foreign government and was 
sentenced in 1987 to life in prison. He admitted to providing Israel with reconnaissance 
images of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunisia, details of 
Iraqi and Syrian chemical-warfare production capabilities, U.S intelligence assessments 
of operations planned by a PLO unit against Israel, and information regarding Soviet 
arms shipments to Syria and other Arab states.331 Pollard was not remorseful upon his 
capture and subsequent conviction and incarceration. The Federal Bureau of Prisons 
reviewed his correspondence and discovered that:  
on three occasions [the] defendant included extensive classified 
information in letters to his wife, and more recently in a letter to an 
attorney/author, who has written critically of the sentence imposed by this 
court and from whom [the] defendant has sought assistance on the public 
relations aspects of his case.332  
Pollard continues to actively campaign for his own release. Between 2013 and 2014, 
President Obama’s administration underwent talks with Israel to exchange Pollard for the 
release of Palestinian prisoners.  
1. Ego and Intellect 
Olive describes Pollard as possessing a sense of inflated importance and a keen 
desire for recognition.333 At first, he was an exceptional employee receiving outstanding 
performance reports, but became less interested in his assigned work and more eager to 
work on projects he found personally interesting. A report by Olive describes Pollard’s 
performance: 
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He failed to meet deadlines. He ignored administrative paperwork. He 
complained about his work being extensively edited. He even questioned 
the professional competence of his immediate supervisors, expressing his 
dissatisfaction to his peers and those above his supervisors in the chain of 
command. Oddly, he continued to receive excellent performance 
reports.334 
Pollard supplied the Israelis thousands of classified documents each month, yet 
received no security training and had no knowledge of the workings of foreign 
intelligence.335 However, his ego led him to believe the Israelis would rescue him if he 
ever got into trouble. On the night of his arrest, Pollard felt since he was Jewish if he 
made it to the grounds of the Israeli embassy, sovereign territory, the Israelis would 
protect him from prosecution and relocate him to Israel.336 
Once arrested, Pollard bragged to the FBI agent, “You botched it! You thought 
this was a Soviet bloc operation, didn’t you?”337 Upon Pollard’s decision to decline the 
presence of an attorney, one interviewer reflected:  
Here was a guy who had admitted to espionage and just tried to gain 
asylum in the Israeli embassy, who was under arrest and in serious trouble, 
yet his reaction was one of overbearing cockiness. Pollard showed no 
remorse for anything. It was as if he were saying, I certainly fooled you, 
you idiots.338 
A former FBI agent who worked the case believes Pollard committed espionage 
for recognition, rather than greed or ideology. Describing Pollard as intellectually 
arrogant and cocky, the agent also saw a desperate, childlike craving for recognition in 
him. Pollard stated that in giving secrets to the Israelis, “[it] made him dream of being a 
hero in the lead tank in a parade going into Jerusalem.”339 The Israelis treated Pollard 
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like a hero and in return he provided classified information. His ego was bolstered when 
he was told, “You’re one of us.”340 
2. Addiction 
Pollard admitted he used marijuana and cocaine on several occasions in the winter 
between 1982 and 1983.341 
3. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
Pollard said he gave classified documents for ideological reasons, to help Israel, 
rather than for money. He did not believe his actions constituted disloyalty, although he 
did consider them dishonest.342 Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang speculate, “He seemed to be 
acting out of a sense of self-justification, against a background of what [he] considered to 
be a corrupt and morally defeated nation.”343 Pollard holds a theory there are  
three classes of Jews: those who travel to the holy land one or more times 
a year; those who don’t or can’t travel there but give Israel money and 
moral support; and finally, Jews like me who can’t afford to travel to 
Israel or give money. When asked to help, we’re willing to do anything for 
the love of our country.344 
In a 61-page motion submitted by the defense prior to sentencing, Pollard stated 
his reason for spying “was to save Israel and to hurt the Soviet Union…[he] was 
motivated by anti-Semitism in his office…and would commit espionage for Israel again 
if given the chance.”345 
Pollard was later questioned under polygraph whether he had spied for Israel for 
financial gain and if he had lied about his true reason for spying. His answer did not 
indicate deception. He insisted initially it was for ideological reasons; however, Pollard 
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later admitted “he was corrupted by remuneration; he had developed an addiction to 
money.”346 
4. Security Concerns 
Pollard had a history of embellishing or making up stories about his past. For 
example, in 1979, he told a colleague that his father had been the CIA station chief at the 
American embassy in South Africa and that he had contacts with the South African 
government,347 which was false. During a security clearance background interview,  
Pollard claimed to have applied for a commission to become an officer in 
the Navy Reserve. He was a natural prevaricator in that he misrepresented 
his educational accomplishments, overstated his language ability, failed to 
mention his history of drug use, and again, lied about his father’s 
relationship with the CIA.348  
While working at the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), Pollard worked long 
hours and weekends, often alone in a sensitive compartmented information facility. This 
should have been cause for concern, but no one reported the suspicious behavior.349 
5. Financial Concerns 
By the 1980s, “Pollard was starting to have problems with money. It was common 
knowledge that he had credit card debts, loan debts, debts on rent and incidental items. 
He missed his rent payment on December 1, 1983.”350 While co-workers were aware of 
his financial difficulty, no one reported anything. In 1984, Pollard received a letter of 
indebtedness from the Navy Federal Credit Union for three months of missed payment on 
a personal loan and a line of credit loan. As Olive explains:  
The navy personnel office forwarded the letter from the credit union to the 
NISC with a reminder that the employee should be informed of the navy’s 
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policy concerning indebtedness and that failure to pay a just debt may 
result in adverse action.351 
This could have allowed for revocation of Pollard’s clearance. As for long-term goals, 
aside from immediate payment for classified information, Pollard acknowledged that he 
hoped to go into preplanned business ventures when he left his position with the Navy.352 
6. Childhood Upbringing 
Pollard has been described as a social outcast, “a wise guy and a troublemaker, a 
flamboyant, loose-lipped person who invited insults and basked in attention, whether 
positive or negative.”353 He felt he was discriminated against because he was Jewish. An 
avid reader, he was considered a sissy when he was young and was bullied. He attended a 
private Jewish school. Olive notes, “There he flourished; playing the cello and reading 
every book he could lay his hands on.”354 
As a world renowned microbiologist, Pollard’s father traveled extensively 
overseas giving lectures and attending conferences.355 In his early teens, Pollard and his 
family traveled to Germany and toured the Dachau concentration camp. As Olive notes, 
“The experience shocked him, kindling a deep, enduring loyalty to Israel and the Jewish 
People.”356 
K. EDWARD SNOWDEN 
Edward Snowden, a former intelligence contractor with the National Security 
Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, disclosed details of classified U.S. and 
British mass surveillance programs that according to administration officials were used to 
detect and track suspected terrorist activity.357 This breach of security caused extreme 
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damage to U.S.-foreign relations and is considered the most damaging leak in U.S. 
history. Much public debate has occurred over whether Snowden is a whistleblower, a 
traitor, or a patriot, and the incident has also sparked debate regarding government 
secrecy and openness. In June 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice charged Snowden 
with theft of government property, unauthorized communication of national defense 
information, and “willful communication of classified communications intelligence 
information to an unauthorized person,”— the last two charges were brought under the 
1917 Espionage Act.358 After fleeing to Hong Kong, Snowden was granted asylum by 
Russia where he remains a fugitive today.  
1. Ego and Intellect 
Snowden described himself as “a senior member of the intelligence community” 
when in fact he was a junior infrastructure analyst.359 Greenwald, The Guardian 
newspaper columnist who first published the mass surveillance program information, 
found Snowden  
highly intelligent and rational, and his thought processes methodical. His 
answers were crisp, clear and cogent. In virtually every case, they were 
directly responsive to what I had asked, thoughtful and deliberate. There 
were no strange detours or wildly improbable stories of the type that are 
the hallmark of emotionally unstable people or those suffering from 
psychological afflictions. His stability and focus instilled confidence.360  
Like many Americans, Snowden became more patriotic after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks. In 2004, at age 20, Snowden “enlisted in the U.S. Army intending 
to fight in the Iraq War, which he thought at the time was a noble effort to free the Iraqi 
people from oppression.”361 During basic training, he felt there was more talk of killing 
rather than liberating Iraqis. In a training accident, he broke both his legs, which ended 
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his military career. Still wanting to serve the country, Snowden began his work with the 
federal government at the CIA.  
2. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty 
As a result of the information to which he was privy:  
Snowden believed that the U.S. government’s stealth attack on [the 
Constitution] was the equivalent of an attack that occupies land—a terrible 
and illegitimate invasion. He viewed his own deeds in explicitly patriotic 
terms. He saw his leak not as an act of betrayal but as a necessary 
corrective to a spy system that had grown dysfunctional.362  
After fleeing to Russia and hoping to regain a more normal life in Germany, Snowden 
prepared a letter for a prominent member of Germany’s Green Party, in which he states it 
was a moral duty which made him disclose the U.S. classified information.363  
Rusbridger, the editor-in-chief of The Guardian newspaper opines,  
His motives are remarkable. Snowden set out to expose the true behavior 
of the U.S. National Security Agency and its allies. On present evidence, 
he has no interest in money—although he could have sold his documents 
to foreign intelligence services for many, many millions. Nor does he have 
the kind of left-wing or Marxist sentiments which could lead him to being 
depicted as un-American. On the contrary, he is an enthusiast for the 
American constitution, and, like other fellow “hacktivists,” is a devotee of 
libertarian politician Ron Paul, whose views are well to the right of many 
Republicans.364  
The countries that Snowden fled to (first to China, then to Russia) are known to violate 
human rights, limit personal freedoms, and to be places where free speech is repressed. 
Snowden felt it was his obligation to the American people and other nations to 
disclose the information for humanitarian reasons. In his own words, “You realize that 
that’s the world you helped create and it’s gonna get worse with the next generation and 
                                                 
362 Harding, The Snowden Files, 110–111.  
363 Romesh Ratnesar, “The Unbearable Narcissism of Edward Snowden,” Bloomberg Businessweek, 
November 1, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-11-01/the-unbearable-narcissism-of-
edward-snowden  
364 Harding, The Snowden Files, 1.  
97 
next generation who extend the capabilities of this sort of architecture of oppression.”365 
He also declared,  
I want to spark a worldwide debate about privacy, Internet freedom, and 
the dangers of state surveillance. I’m not afraid of what will happen to me. 
I’ve accepted that my life will likely be over from my doing this. I am at 
peace with that. I know it’s the right thing to do.366  
He explains:  
Accordingly, I did what I believed right and began a campaign to correct 
this wrongdoing. I did not seek to enrich myself. I did not seek to sell U.S. 
secrets. I did not partner with any foreign governments to guarantee my 
safety. Instead, I took what I knew to the public, so what affects all of us 
can be discussed by all of us in the light of day, and I asked the world for 
justice. The moral decision to tell the public about spying that affects all of 
us has been costly, but it was the right thing to do and I have no regrets.367 
3. Security Concerns 
While working as a contractor at Booz, Allen, Hamilton, Snowden was fired “for 
violations of the firm’s code of ethics.”368 
L. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CASES 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has two components in the 
Intelligence Community, DHS Headquarters (HQ) and the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG). The headquarters element, Intelligence and Analysis, is a consumer of other 
agencies intelligence, but it does not originate information. To date, there has been no 
DHS employee convicted of espionage. DHS was created with the passage of the 
Homeland Security Act in November 2002, which combined 22 different federal agencies 
and departments and officially standing alone on March 1, 2003.369 Providing that some 
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of the original employees continue to work at the department, it is feasible DHS could 
experience a serious event of unauthorized disclosure.  
Research conducted by the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) 
has determined those who execute unauthorized disclosures do so after an average of 12 
years of service.370 This reflects the average time it takes for an employee to know a 
position well enough, have access to materials and achieve the comfort level to steal 
classified national security information and have the nerve to sell it or disclose it to the 
general public. There have, however, been releases of classified information to the media. 
In one case, a senior DHS official disclosed classified information to the media in order 
to promote a policy he supported. Once discovered, DHS opened an investigation; 
however, the employee left government service before remedial action could be taken. 
The Department of Justice declined to prosecute criminally. Without additional details, 
“ideology to promote policy” appears to be the primary indicator.  
In another instance, a mid-level DHS employee disclosed classified information 
in a master’s thesis while attending the Naval Postgraduate School. While classified, the 
information was identified from open-sources and was originally incorrectly marked by 
the originating agency. Portions of the thesis were later published in a scholarly journal, 
and an employee at the originating agency determined the information was classified. 
Investigation determined this to be a case of inadvertent disclosure, and no administrative 
action was taken.  
The USCG is both an originator of sensitive maritime information and consumer 
of other agencies’ intelligence. In a recent case, an intelligence specialist with the USCG 
admitted to passing classified material to foreign nationals and unauthorized individuals. 
He pleaded guilty in May 2012 to willful dereliction of duty to protect classified 
information.  
From the research, the indicators of behavioral indicators of spying are ranked in 
the following order: ideology/disillusionment/loyalty concerns, large ego and high 
intellect, financial concerns and childhood upbringing, security concerns, and addiction.  
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VIII. DISCUSSION OF DATA 
Upon review of existing data (see Table 1), the prevalent behavioral characteristic 
of the cases (10 out of 11 cases) is one of a disgruntled employee (ideology/
disillusionment/loyalty). A disgruntled employee becomes the largest concern of insider 
threat, one who is willing to compromise his or her feelings of loyalty to the organization 
and choose loyalty to oneself over country and colleagues. The Defense Personnel 
Security Research Center (PERSEREC) has noted in its studies, that since 1990 the 
majority of offenders are naturalized citizens.371 This thesis research was based solely on 
native borne American citizens; however, it could easily be argued that in each case the 
individual had foreign connections, attachments, or ties. Most notable is the case of Ana 
Montes, who came from a Hispanic background and found herself disillusioned with U.S 
foreign policy toward Cuba. Divided loyalties can also be seen in the cases of Ames, 
Hanssen, and Walker, with their fascination with the Soviet Union and Russia. Manning 
and Snowden also felt foreign policy was misrepresented by U.S. presence in the Middle 
East. Pollard had feelings of discrimination because of his Jewish background.  
The second predominant characteristic is ego and intellect (eight out of 10 cases). 
It could certainly be argued that in any of the cases studied, the individuals needed to be 
of some level of higher intelligence to be able to successfully remove classified national 
security information from their places of employment, transmit it to an outside source, or 
take it from the confines of the workplace and drop it at designated locations. Certainly in 
the cases of Ames, Montes, Hanssen, Walker, and Pollard, the longevity of their careers 
in spying reflects a certain level of skill and cunning. Interestingly, a number of the 
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people in the cases had personality quirks. Those with high intellect were able to 
persuade colleagues and supervisors of their innocence. Indeed, Ames was able to forge 
his own security clearance as well as pass polygraph exams—even while being deceptive. 
Fischer refers to a frequent trait of those who spy when he wrote: “obsessive self-
centeredness or selfishness—a lack of genuine caring for others and an indifference to 
problems experienced by other persons.”372 This is clearly illustrated by the comments 
made by Montes’s sister, when she wrote,  
You betrayed your family, you betrayed all your friends. Everyone who 
loves you was betrayed by you. You betrayed your co-workers and your 
employer, and you betrayed your nation. You worked for an evil 
megalomaniac who shares or sells our secrets to our enemies.373  
Project Slammer, “an innovative community research program using…behavioral 
science techniques…to better understand and deter espionage,”374 has concluded from 
psychological testing and interviews that those who commit espionage have “two, almost 
opposite, personality types among [the] 30 offenders under study—one, a highly 
manipulative, dominant and self-serving type; the other, passive, easily influenced and 
lacking self-esteem.”375  
Financial concern (seven out of 11 cases) is often thought to be a high motivator, 
notwithstanding PERSEREC’s determination. Since 1990, 80 percent of those who 
committed unauthorized disclosure did so voluntarily and without payment.376 Those 
who did receive payment included Ames, Hanssen, Pollard, and Walker who began 
selling information prior to the 1990s and were well compensated. In 2008, Bergersen 
was successfully paid and was certainly motivated by financial gain, as were Regan and 
Underwood. Later incidents indicate a possible shift in motivation for divulging state 
secrets. Montes, while beginning her spy career in 1985, did so primarily for ideological 
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reasons, as did Abu-Jihaad, Manning, and Snowden. This may indicate a shift in the way 
citizens view the U.S. government (i.e., a government that while declaring more 
transparency actually seems to exhibit more secrecy). Indeed, Sarbin, Carney, and 
Eoyang found that in reviewing  
case summaries of convicted citizen spies [from 1984–1994] shows that 
the most frequently mentioned reason for stealing and selling government 
secrets is financial gain. To a lesser extent, some offenders tell a story in 
which they perceive themselves as victims of unjust authority and construe 
their theft and marketing of secrets as revenge. In at least one case, the 
theft and attempted sale of information was in part motivated by 
‘sensation seeking,’ the feeling of excitement that frequently accompanies 
the commission of a forbidden act. Save for the few offenders whose 
motives stemmed from political convictions, financial gain appeared to be 
a significant element in the motive structure of known spies.377  
Sibley goes beyond financial gain, expressing:  
We tend to think people are largely motivated by material concerns. But 
that’s superficial. We’re also motivated by what the philosophers call the 
desire for recognition. Beyond food, shelter, sex and comfort, we much 
more powerfully seek to establish our lives as significant and 
meaningful.378  
Thus, he notes about Hanssen:  
Seen this way, money was icing on the cake for Hanssen. More telling is 
his apparent disdain for his country. America, [Hanssen] wrote, “can be 
errantly likened to a powerfully built, but retarded child, potentially 
dangerous, but young, immature and easily manipulated.” This not only 
suggests someone alienated from society, but, conversely, someone 
frustrated by society’s lack of recognition.379 
While personal security background investigations review information from the 
present as far back as 10 years prior, studies of espionage based on personal interviews 
with offenders suggest a pattern in which personal disruptions or crises precede, or 
‘trigger,’ an individual’s decision to commit espionage. Crises could be positive or 
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negative, and include divorce, death, starting a new relationship, or observed by 
exhibiting radically changed behavior. Commentators have speculated that if help or 
timely intervention had been offered in these cases, the crime might have been averted.380  
Thus,  
Assessing the quality of a person’s moral development at an early life 
stage may be irrelevant to the context of later action when unforeseen 
events create a condition of personal strain for which trust violation would 
be a possible resolution.381  
These stressors may be better understood using the context of Henri Tajfel’s 
social identity theory (SIT). Tajfel explains: “Social identity is understood as the part of 
the individuals’ self-concept which derives from knowledge of their membership of a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to 
that membership.”382 What leads some to leave social groups, co-workers, and the 
organization, in search of other groups (i.e., foreign countries)? Examination of the 
various cases using SIT may provide some insight as to not only why, by how authorities 
could have detected basic changes in a person’s character. Ames diagnosis himself using 
SIT. He explains:  
My frustration comes from attempts by you [the author of Ames’ story, 
Peter Earley] and my FBI and CIA debriefers to simplify and find a single, 
overriding reason for what happened, when, in fact, there is no single 
reason, but layers upon layers upon layers of reasons, none more pressing 
than the others, and added to these layers are the events themselves, an 
almost-never-to-be-repeated coming together of circumstances, which 
facilitated a fantasy, causing it suddenly to gel, without conscious 
realization or careful, even painful, thought, into a real plan…. The unique 
circumstances were critical. They created the opportunity…. To attempt to 
rank or segregate or declare that one factor provides the explanation is to 
deny how a person feels, thinks, and acts.383 
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It can be argued almost every individual experiences some suffering during 
childhood (childhood concerns), whether abuse by family members, classmates, or 
bullies (as did individuals in seven out of 11 cases). However, when reviewing the 
numbers of known unauthorized disclosures in relation to the half million or more U.S. 
personal security clearance holders, most will not sell or give classified national security 
information away. Sarbin, Carney and Eoyang believe spying is strongly related to:  
A common…contributing condition is the experience of alienation, of low 
self-esteem, a condition for which money is often seen as a solution. When 
lawful means of dealing with self-esteem problems are in short supply or 
exhausted, the potential offender may consider illegitimate means….ready 
to incorporate the plot of spy into his self-narrative.384  
Fischer notes, “We do know…many were victims of severe child abuse which 
resulted in an intense self-esteem problem. Others appear to have been raised without the 
benefit of moral training or positive role models.”385 For example, Ames was encouraged 
to learn about the finer things in life when he was young and told he was better than 
others. In other examples, Hanssen and Walker were psychologically and physically 
abused, and Manning believes her father ejected her from his residence as a result of her 
sexual orientation. Whether physical or emotional, if an individual does not have the 
coping skills and is psychologically vulnerable, additional stressors most likely will result 
in impairment of the individual’s judgement. 
In six out of the 11 cases reviewed, individuals had histories of serious security 
concerns prior to apprehension (except in the case of Edward Snowden who remains on 
temporary asylum in Russia). While security violations of several of the individuals were 
noted within their organizations, they were rarely admonished. For example, even if a 
recommendation was made to downgrade or suspend a security clearance of an 
individual, often no further action would be taken at the next level or the individual 
would change positions in order to avoid revocation of clearances. Ames and Walker 
were noted for foreign contact and alcoholism. They, along with Hanssen, were noted for 
their affluence. Yet, because of personality traits, colleagues wanted to believe there was 
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nothing amiss. This, in part, is an aspect of the office culture that must change. Co-
workers must feel empowered and supported in informing supervisors or security 
personnel of behavioral and character changes that create security concerns.  
Manning was reprimanded for releasing sensitive information in a YouTube post, 
two years before her unauthorized disclosure to Wikileaks. She had a history of 
aggressive behavior towards fellow soldiers, as well as dealing with the psychological 
pressure of being a homosexual or transgender in the era of the military’s don’t ask, don’t 
tell policy. Meanwhile, Snowden was fired for violating his workplace ethics code. If 
security concerns were taken more seriously, many unauthorized disclosures could have 
been mitigated or prevented. 
Finally, addiction to alcohol or drugs was documented in only four of the 11 cases 
I studied. In the case of Hanssen, I have characterized a sex addiction. Additionally, it 
could be argued that all of the cases exhibit some sort of addiction. Perhaps in a broader 
sense, addiction could be related to the exhilaration of being a spy, being perceived as a 
patriot, or changing foreign policy. However, in 2014, Paul Johnson found that a 
significant number of those who were determined to be insider threats have an addiction 
to gambling or prescription drugs and that financing these addictions is a primary 
motivator for associated criminal behavior.386  
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Table 1.   Behavioral Indicators Found in Cases Reviewed 
Subject










Ames X X X X X
Montes X X X
Manning X X X X




Hanssen X X X X X X
Walker X X X X X X
Pollard X X X X X X
Snowden X X X




In the final analysis, there is no way to determine how many potential spies or 
persons bent on disclosing classified information have been eliminated through the 
vetting of data collected during the initial security clearance request process. Depicted in 
this thesis is the result of employees who passed the screening process and were fully 
trusted in performing their duties. The conclusion to be drawn from this is two-fold. First, 
first- and second-line managers of employees who have access to classified information 
must be keenly aware of any changes in the personality of their employees. They must go 
beyond simply giving work assignments and grading results. In addition, managers have 
to be able to read slight changes in attitude, performance, personality, and be prepared to 
make tough decisions about taking positive action when nuances, however slight, are 
detected. Because intellect and ego play an important part in employee performance, 
managers must be trained to deal with employees whose behavior is outside the norm in 
those regards. Second, managers must, on a regular basis, encourage all employees to be 
mindful of personality or lifestyle changes of fellow employees and provide a protected 
avenue for them to discuss fellow employee behavior. “See something, say something” is 
a phrase that belongs in the work place and applies to both personality and material 
things. Recognizing and dealing with disgruntled employees might just prevent or 
mitigate unauthorized disclosure. Disgruntlement leads to changes in ideology, 
disillusionment with one’s organization, and ultimately may change a person’s national 
loyalty; these are the predominant factors found supervisors must be aware of. 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion 1 
Unauthorized disclosure of classified information can have many results: 
compromise of intelligence sources and collection methods, loss of life, financial impact, 
and serious harmful effects on U.S. foreign relations. This research has found that 
ideology, disillusionment, and questionable loyalty are primary motivators for a person to 
release classified information without authorization. Disclosures are often related to 
personal crises, such as financial problems, some type of addiction, or divorce. However, 
millions of federal employees with access to classified information face similar personal 
crises in their lives; yet, they do not commit unauthorized disclosure. According to 
Herbig:  
Pressure does tip some people away from their apparent stability into 
doing impulsive or desperate things, and espionage is occasionally one of 
those desperate things. At a minimum, this suggests that managers of 
employees with access to classified or sensitive information should take 
seriously their responsibility to be aware of unusual stresses in their 
employees’ lives, and to sensitively monitor and try to assist employees in 
crisis.387  
People change over time as they face many difficult life events.  
Recommendation 1 
Management must continually monitor employee behavior to ensure employees 
remain reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and loyal to the United 
States throughout their time of employment and into post-employment. This is especially 
critical for first- and second-line supervisors. In the military, there are many stories about 
first-line supervisors (squad leaders) and second-line supervisors (platoon sergeants and 
platoon leaders) who are intimately involved in their “employees” lives and are well 
aware of what is happening in their lives on and off the job. It is not as easy in the 
civilian world, but civilian supervisors must have a feel for what is going on in the lives 
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of their employees. This can occur as simply as organizing periodic in-office social 
functions such as birthday observances, occasional office potluck lunches, and 
recognition and awards ceremonies. Semi-annual or annual evening functions are another 
option. It is important supervisors use each of these occasions to talk with their 
employees to genuinely determine employee satisfaction or dissatisfaction and any 
changes that might be occurring in their lives. 
Conclusion 2 
Increased, in-depth background investigations and vetting would enhance the 
prevention of unauthorized disclosure. Currently, initial and subsequent investigations are 
incomplete or inaccurate because potential or active clearance holders fail to report past 
or current offenses, use false identities, or are born and raised in foreign countries where 
records may be difficult to review. In addition, inaccurate or incomplete reports are often 
a result of one agency failing to provide information to another for a variety of reasons. 
Thirty years ago, Jonathan Pollard applied for a position with the Central Intelligence 
Agency but was rejected for admitting extensive drug use. Upon applying to the Navy, 
the Navy requested any information about Pollard from the CIA. The CIA denied such 
information believing Pollard had a right to privacy.388 This simple exchange of 
information could have prevented Pollard from obtaining a clearance and going on to sell 
classified information. 
Recommendation 2 
DHS HQ must engage Congress to enact legislation that directs all federal 
agencies to respond accurately and in a timely manner to all requests for information 
from the Central Clearance Facility (CCF) in support of a background investigation on a 
prospective federal clearance holder. The CCF must work with each state to obtain 
similar transparency so state criminal and financial data bases can be queried by CCF.  
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Conclusion 3 
Self-reporting changes in lifestyles (positive or negative) are a critical piece in 
maintaining employee accountability for being a trusted person. Fear of repercussion is a 
major factor in employees’ not self-reporting drastic changes. According to Chaney, “The 
true cases of concern are those individuals who can preserve a calm outward demeanor 
while their private life descends into an awful pit.”389 Intelligence community 
professionals recognize that revealing negative life events can result in discipline, which 
can include revocation of a clearance and possibly dismissal from government service. 
Chaney views the insider threat as an individual who has problems coping with stress. He 
explains:  
The insider spy seriously considers himself to be a patriotic American. 
Old-fashioned traditional values that were imbued in him in grade school 
stay alive within his heart. The insider spy’s beef was usually never with 
our country. His beef was really with himself. At his weakest moment, his 
way of handling overwhelming stress was to project his self-
disappointment and anger onto the nearest handy target, typically his 
home agency.390  
Also it is paramount for co-workers and supervisors to notice changes in 
employee activities, and they must be empowered to report suspicious behavior. 
Colleagues do not want to think the worst about those with whom they work, let alone 
report those suspicions to management; however, sometimes this is exactly what must be 
done. Early intervention to prevent an employee going by the wayside could help prevent 
unauthorized disclosures.  
Recommendation 3 
Managers must implement training programs that extol the benefits of self-
reporting and assure employees there are programs to help them get through any current 
problems that could make them a security risk. If the employee completes the program, it 
is possible that the employee can be returned to full employment or placed in a non-
classified position.  
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Conclusion 4 
Executive Order 13589, Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified 
Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information, was 
issued in 2011; however, in January 2015, DOD reported its Insider Threat Detection 
Program estimated initial operating capability is not expected until January 2017 with no 
projection when full operating capability will occur.391 This executive action is a direct 
result of the WikiLeaks disclosures. The executive order requires the federal government, 
under the co-chair of the director of national intelligence and the attorney general, to 
develop an insider threat program for:  
deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the 
safeguarding of classified information from exploitation, compromise, or 
other unauthorized disclosure, taking into account risk levels, as well as 
the distinct needs, missions, and systems of individual agencies. This 
program shall include development of policies, objectives, and priorities 
for establishing and integrating security, counterintelligence, user audits 
and monitoring, and other safeguarding capabilities and practices within 
agencies.392  
Recommendation 4 
DHS HQ must determine what assistance is required to develop an insider threat 
program to allow for earlier implementation. This will require direct coordination with 
the offices working this issue at the national level. 
Conclusion 5 
The current security clearance process is weak and needs to be revamped. As 
Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang illustrate, there is no method that could identify current or 
future “spies” and differentiate them from innocent employees. They continue to say, 
“The issue becomes especially controversial when it comes to assessments of personal 
loyalty, patriotism and reliability.”393 This certainly can be seen in the cases of Chelsea 
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Manning and Edward Snowden. Public opinion is widely divided whether these two are 
traitors or heroes. Known unauthorized disclosure instances are rare:  
each known case very complex, and scientific research virtually 
nonexistent, there is no well-established characteristic, psychological or 
otherwise, that can serve as a reliable indicator of spying propensity…. 
While all spies may be dishonest, very few dishonest individuals are 
spies.394  
If clearance processes were so stringent to detect individuals who may disclose 
information, many innocent personnel could also be determined to be security risks.  
The Defense Security Service (DSS) notes that background investigations are 
missing critical information such as self-reported character flaws or misbehavior and 
information contained in state and local criminal records. While current law requires this 
information to be provided to an investigator, no action is taken against those states and 
localities that do not comply.395 This results in incomplete investigations that pave the 
way for favorable adjudications and granting of security clearances that might otherwise 
not have been granted. This happened in the case of Aaron Alexis, the Washington Navy 
Yard shooter. While this was not a “disclosure” incident, Alexis was able to gain access 
to a restricted area by virtue of his security clearance.  
Recommendation 5 
A commission led by the Office of Personnel Management should be formed to 
look at improving security clearance processes. Additionally, there must be strict 
enforcement of laws that grant clearance processors authority to access state and local 
records.  
Conclusion 6 
Peer reporting rarely occurs. Personnel must understand and feel confident in 
reporting requirements of suspicious behaviors or life-changing events affecting their 
colleagues. This includes, but is not limited to, intention to marry a foreign national, 
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unusual and frequent foreign travel, bankruptcy, or treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. 
The potential of having an employee who might disclose classified information can be 
reduced if colleagues are able to recognize the potential indicators and are willing to 
intervene.396 An individual lacking the coping mechanisms or the support system to deal 
with stressful life events may become susceptible to committing unauthorized 
disclosures. The organization and its personnel must make a commitment to uphold 
social conventions and intervene early when behavioral indicators show an employee 
may become susceptible to committing a crime. Important factors in instilling 
organization culture are “group cohesiveness, group incentive (reward) structures, 
relatively small group size, membership stability and relatively high functional 
dependence among group members.”397 While the federal government, as a whole, is 
certainly not a small group size, those teams who share projects and view the same 
classified information are. These small groups must unify to establish the overall 
organizational culture, one to which each employee is bonded. According to a report by 
PERSEREC,  
Under internal control systems, the group uses its social influence to 
regulate members’ work activities. Identification with and loyalty to one’s 
colleagues are thought to be engendered when a group member sees 
himself or herself as a pivotal contributor to the group’s outcomes and 
when the group is viewed by the member to be to be an important source 
of personal successes. Internal control systems encourage such states by 
emphasizing personal responsibility to one’s colleagues, and adherence to 
the work group’s standards for conduct.398 
Recommendation 6 
The executive branch should amend E.O. 13589 and add mandatory training for 
all employees and supervisors as a part of each federal agency’s insider threat program. 
This will strengthen and mandate training in peer reporting for both employees and 
enhance supervisors’ abilities to handle such reports. A part of this program must ensure 
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employees are granted complete privacy and anonymity when reporting on a fellow 
employee’s changed behavior or significant lifestyle changes. 
Conclusion 7 
Until this year, there has been no systematic method to continuously evaluate 
employee behavior or character changes. E.O. 13467 defines continuous evaluation (CE) 
as:  
reviewing the background of an individual who has been determined to be 
eligible for access to classified information (including additional or new 
checks of commercial databases, government databases, and other 
information lawfully available to security officials) at any time during the 
period of eligibility to determine whether that individual continues to meet 
the requirements for eligibility for access to classified information.399  
Assessing data automatically derived from credit background checks, social media, 
personnel records, and self-reporting records, may reveal relevant information, prompting 
further investigation and enabling agencies to prioritize their efforts on those who appear 
to have the highest risk. As noted earlier, there are many inaccuracies in obtaining data in 
the initial clearance process. This could be critical information in granting or not granting 
a clearance. Recently, the Department of Defense initiated a pilot program that tested the 
validity of its Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES). The test program 
sampled 3,370 Army service members, civilian employees, and contractor personnel. It 
discovered that 21.7 percent of the tested population had previously unreported 
derogatory information that had developed since the last investigation, and three percent 
had serious derogatory information (for example, financial issues, domestic abuse, drug 
abuse) that resulted in a revocation or suspension of a security clearance.400 The 
frequency of these data checks would allow for a more real-time assessment to better 
monitor the behavior of any clearance holder and alert security officers for the need to 
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conduct an investigation. Using a program such as ACES could significantly reduce the 
cost of background investigations by monitoring employees in real time on a random and 
more frequent basis. However, there has to be an acceptable level of confidence in the 
ACES results to make it worthwhile. 
Recommendation 7 
[That the] National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) in 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) [aggressively 
continue to establish] a Continuous Evaluation Program (CEP) to develop 
an enterprise-wide CE tool for Executive Branch use, and to coordinate, 
align, and integrate Executive Branch departments and agencies’ CE 
activities to address these conclusions…. A limited CE capability will be 
developed and implemented in select agencies for a portion of the [Top 
Secret]TS/SCI-cleared population in FY 2015, with the objective of 
expanding to all executive branch departments and agencies with a TS/SCI 
population by the end of FY 2016. Executive Branch departments and 
agencies will align and integrate their agency-specific CE capabilities to 
the new federal CE solution.401 
Conclusion 8 
There appears to be no consistent or continuous review of positions where 
classified documents are handled. According to a guide by the Defense Security Service: 
Executive branch policy expressly directs agencies to minimize the 
number of individuals with eligibility for access to classified information 
to that required to conduct agency functions. It also expressly prohibits 
requesting eligibility in excess of actual requirements. Despite these 
policies, 5.1 million employees and contractors were eligible for security 
clearances as of October 2013.402  
Many positions may no longer require access to classified information or could be 
downgraded to a lower security clearance level, resulting in decreased costs of 
maintaining a security clearance with reduced periodic reinvestigations or eliminating the 
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requirement for a clearance. This thought is echoed by the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, which writes:  
In 2012, 4.9 million Americans—over 1.5 percent of our country’s 
population—held security clearances. The Executive Branch must study 
whether so many clearances are necessary, and find ways to better 
determine whether someone needs access to classified materials or spaces. 
The Executive Branch should take steps to reduce the over-classification 
of information, which would reduce the number of clearances needed. 
Another possible solution is to create a system of temporary clearances 
that expire after a pre-determined amount of time. Ensuring that only those 
who actually need security clearances receive clearances would go a long 
way to reducing the pressures on the investigation and adjudication 
processes.403 
Recommendation 8 
The secretary of homeland security must engage the director of national 
intelligence (DNI) to issue guidance to all executive agencies on determining what 
positions require security clearances. In addition, DNI must implement some method of 
ensuring periodic review of such positions to determine continued validity. 
Conclusion 9 
The Internet and social media sites along with traditional media venues have 
lessened the standard obstacles in disclosing classified information without authorization 
and have “dramatically increased the ease with which reporters, editors and publishers 
can evade laws or regulations pertaining to the publication [of] classified information.”404 
Releasing classified information has become exceptionally simplified with the creation of 
disclosure websites such as WikiLeaks and Cryptome on which one can anonymously 
upload information to the site for broadcast to a wide population. Sarbin, Carney, and 
Eoyang note traditional media assists in promulgating the information pointing out “it is 
unlikely that WikiLeaks data dump would have had the public impact that it did, had The 
New York Times not curated the disclosures, drawing the attention of readers to particular 
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facts, providing context, and commissioning supporting editorials.”405 Modern mass 
media and Internet access allowed disclosures by Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden 
to broadcast American secrets throughout the United States and worldwide.  
Recommendation 9 
The Center for Security Clearances must explore new automated technologies, as 
well as media security technologies, in order to determine critical indicators that may 
shed light on character flaws of current and prospective government security clearance 
holders. 
Conclusion 10 
While the number of overall unauthorized disclosure cases is small, the 
information disclosed has been significant. As noted, the primary reasons for 
unauthorized disclosure found during this research are ideology, disillusionment, and 
loyalty. As such, the most effective approach to prevent unauthorized disclosure is to 
create a work environment that provides for high morale, and loyalty to the organization 
and co-workers. According to Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang, “Instilling organizational 
pride, promoting esprit de corps, and making someone a winning team are all means to 
stimulate positive effects.”406 Organizations must “create opportunities to deal with 
disgruntled employees, employees with financial problems, or employees with alcohol or 
drug dependencies before they took revenge or betrayed their trust by disclosing 
classified information or selling trade secrets.”407 Disgruntled employees must have an 
outlet to address their grievances. There was no such venue in the cases of Aldrich Ames 
and Robert Hanssen. Once Ana Montes made her feelings against U.S. foreign policy 
clear, access to classified information should have been limited immediately. Sarbin, 
Carney, and Eoyang argue, “More powerful prevention and detection results could be 
obtained by relying on the promotion of strong group cohesiveness coupled with social 
                                                 
405 Ibid., 178–179.  
406 Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang, Citizen Espionage, 8. 
407 Ibid., 14. 
117 
integrity that enforces responsibility for security on those closest to the problems.”408 
Cohesiveness is enforced by a culture of social control. Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang 
explain:  
The essential elements are 1) the individual; 2) a social entity—not just the 
generalized society but a defined social entity such as a family, a tribe, a 
school, a military unit, or a psychological researcher; and 3) some kind of 
co-presence, so that the individual is with the social entity, at least in a 
psychological sense but usually in an obvious physical sense. Social 
control in operation is pervasive and simple: The individual acts in 
conformity to the norms, values and standards of the salient social entity. 
This is normatively what happens all the time. We are conforming, we are 
obedient, and we observe and respect social conventions. We are largely—
all of us—under social control most of the time.409  
Recommendation 10 
Managers (supervisors) and fellow employees must be vigilant and question any 
situation where any one individual amasses a significant amount of classified information 
or stores a massive amount on a computer or external hard drive. Constant monitoring of 
stored classified information should be mandatory. In the past, as well as in the current 
climate, employees are allowed to store metadata on computers without those files being 
logged in/logged out or accounted for. This recommendation will indeed demand a 
change in the way the government accounts for stored electronic files.  
Conclusion 11 
A person’s untrustworthiness is difficult to assess or measure using current 
methodology. 
Recommendation 11 
A wide variety of personality tests have been developed, notably the Myers 
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), the MMPI, and a number of tests based on the five factor 
model of personality, such as the Revised NEO Personality Inventory.410 Short of a 
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number of expensive psychiatric visits, administering personality tests could be an 
expensive yet effective method to initially determine if a person being considered for a 
security clearance in the federal government. The recommendation would include 
administering the tests during follow-up investigations or clearance renewal.  
119 
X. EPILOGUE 
Ultimately, the insider threat is a person who works among us. Although the DHS 
has not suffered the expense and embarrassment of an insider divulging a serious volume 
of sensitive or classified information, it should take a very strong stance on implementing 
extensive training programs that target employees and supervisors. Its system must be 
strengthened using modern information technology employing current social behavior 
software. Additionally, colleagues and first line managers must be empowered to 
monitor, report, respond, and mitigate suspicious behavior to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure. Effective training and awareness programs must be fully developed. 
Employees must understand their roles and responsibilities, whether a security clearance 
holder or not. These training programs must not be ones that sit on the shelf only to be 
reviewed after an incident occurs, they must be developed, employed, and updated on a 
regular basis. At a minimum, insider threat awareness should be a mandatory, quarterly 
all personnel presentation. Studies by Fischer determined:  
Many…former spies claim that their decision to commit this crime was 
based in part on their belief that the probability of being noticed and 
reported by co-workers was next to nothing…. Intervene in the interest of 
an at-risk employee before he or she becomes a threat to national security. 
… A workplace in which people are known to be aware and willing to 
take action when appropriate presents a powerful deterrent to 
espionage.411  
Without a diligent workforce that is trained to detect even minor character 
changes in colleagues, the ability to prevent unauthorized disclosure is greatly 
diminished. DHS must participate in a complete review of the security clearance process 
in coordination with other federal agencies. DHS should be the initiator in the formation 
of a joint federal agency commission that reviews the present security clearance process 
and recommends implementation of improved processes that enhance the security 
clearance program. Finally, DHS should complete a comprehensive review of all 
positions currently requiring a security clearance to ensure access to classified 
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information is limited to persons whose official duties require knowledge of possession 
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